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Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate 
Reform 
Renee M. Jones∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Many commentators have criticized the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as evidence of 
the “creeping federalization of corporate law.”1 In this Article, I argue that a realistic 
threat of federalization is necessary to ensure the robust development of corporate law at 
the state level. Recent research suggests that Delaware enjoys a monopoly position in the 
market for “out-of-state” incorporations. This means that little pressure actually comes 
from other states which might push Delaware to shape its corporate law to increase 
protections for shareholders and other constituent groups. 
The federal government, however, can serve as a credible rival to Delaware. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s apparent influence on Delaware corporate law suggests the 
potential for a dynamic relationship between state and federal regulation of corporate 
conduct. Recent Delaware court decisions indicate that Delaware’s judiciary has begun to 
respond to this preemptive threat by adjusting its corporate law jurisprudence. The courts 
appear to be moving to more restrictive application of the business judgment rule and 
more vigorous enforcement of officers’ and directors’ fiduciary duties. This 
jurisprudential shift demonstrates that Congress can effectively influence state law 
through legislative measures that do not require complete preemption of state law. 
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McMorrow, Jim Repetti, Fred Yen, and participants in faculty workshops at Boston College, Suffolk 
University, and University of Connecticut law schools. Thanks also to John Choe and Jinny Ahn for valuable 
research assistance. Research support for this Article was provided by a Boston College research grant 
generously funded by David Perini. 
 1. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring, 2003, 
at 26. 
JONES FINAL 5/13/2004  2:41 PM 
626 The Journal of Corporation Law [Spring 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 627 
II.  THE “RACE” DEBATE................................................................................................ 629 
A.  The Modern Debate ....................................................................................... 629 
B.  The Reality ..................................................................................................... 631 
III.  HORIZONTAL VS. VERTICAL REGULATORY COMPETITION....................................... 633 
A.  Horizontal Competition.................................................................................. 633 
B.  Vertical Competition ...................................................................................... 634 
IV.  TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF VERTICAL REGULATORY COMPETITION...................... 636 
A.  Advantages..................................................................................................... 636 
B.  Objections ...................................................................................................... 637 
1.  The Federal Constraint is too Weak ......................................................... 637 
2.  Delaware’s Dominance Lacks Legitimacy................................................ 638 
C.  Summary ........................................................................................................ 639 
V.  SARBANES-OXLEY: THE FEDERAL PREEMPTIVE THREAT ......................................... 640 
A.  Corporate Scandals........................................................................................ 640 
B.  Sarbanes-Oxley .............................................................................................. 641 
C.  Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley .......................................................................... 642 
VI.  DELAWARE’S RESPONSE.......................................................................................... 643 
A.  The Perceived Threat ..................................................................................... 643 
B.  The Judicial Response.................................................................................... 644 
C.  Delaware Law: Pre-Enron ............................................................................ 646 
1.  The Duty of Care....................................................................................... 646 
2.  The Duty of Loyalty................................................................................... 648 
3.  Procedural Protections ............................................................................. 649 
a.  Demand Requirement ..................................................................... 650 
b.  Special Litigation Committees........................................................ 650 
4.  Disney Litigation (Disney I) ...................................................................... 651 
5.  Question of Independence ......................................................................... 653 
D.  Delaware Law: Post Enron ........................................................................... 654 
1.  Duty of Care.............................................................................................. 655 
2.  Duty of Loyalty.......................................................................................... 657 
a.  Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson.............................................................. 657 
b.  Krasner v. Moffett .......................................................................... 659 
3.  Procedural Defenses ................................................................................. 660 
4.  Question of Independence ......................................................................... 661 
5. Summary .................................................................................................... 662 
F.  Looking Forward ........................................................................................... 662 
VII.  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 663 
JONES FINAL 5/13/2004  2:41 PM 




“If we don’t fix it, Congress will, but I hope they’ve gone as far as they’re going to 
have to go.”2 This statement from one of our country’s most respected jurists forms part 
of an ongoing effort to retain the state of Delaware’s legitimacy and power in the realm 
of corporate law, in the face of recent federal encroachments on state law territory. 
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey made this statement in the 
wake of recent corporate scandals and Congress’ subsequent adoption of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 20023 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the “Act”). 
Chief Justice Veasey’s words are an unusually blunt acknowledgment that in 
determining the legal rules that affect America’s largest corporations, the state of 
Delaware is constrained most significantly by the federal government. His words suggest 
that standard arguments prevalent in academic literature which extol the benefits of 
competition among states for corporate charters are misconceived. Instead, Chief Justice 
Veasey tacitly admits that the federal government is Delaware’s main rival in the 
development of corporate law rules. This implied absence of state-to-state competition 
suggests the need to reconsider the appropriate role of the federal government as a 
corporate regulator. 
To some, Sarbanes-Oxley represents an ill-advised advance in the “creeping 
federalization of corporate law.”4 The Act does indeed federalize some aspects of 
corporate law, and properly so. Because of Delaware’s dominant position in the market 
for out-of-state incorporations, the federalization of corporate law (or at least the threat of 
federalization) is necessary to ensure that corporate law developed at the state level 
adequately addresses concerns of national scope, rather than furthering purely local 
interests. 
The longstanding academic debate about whether competition among states for 
corporate charters has led to a “race-to-the-bottom” or a “race-to-the-top” in corporate 
law,5 exaggerates the true extent of competition among states for corporate charters. 
 2. What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, A Roundtable Moderated by Charles Elson, HARV. 
BUS. REV. Jan. 2003, at 68, 70 (quoting E. Norman Veasey, Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court) 
[hereinafter Roundtable]. 
 3. Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002), codified at scattered sections of 11, 15, 28 and 29 U.S.C.A. [hereinafter 
Sarbanes-Oxley or the Act]. 
 4. See Bainbridge, supra note 1; see also Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some 
Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 672-74 
(2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 57-59 (2002). 
 5. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); see also Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 
117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969) [hereinafter, Law for Sale]; RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT 
CORPORATION (1976); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal 
Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947 (1990) (race-to-the-bottom); Roberta Romano, Law 
as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, 
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Instead, recent scholarship suggests no race exists at all.6 That is, when a corporation 
considers a state other than its home state in which to incorporate, it almost invariably 
chooses Delaware.7 These same commentators have observed that other states do not 
actively compete with Delaware for charters.8 Neither the statutes, the court systems, nor 
the corporate franchise tax structures of these states appear designed to allow the states to 
generate additional revenue by attracting out-of-state incorporations.9
For years, scholars have argued that competition among states leads to greater 
innovation and experimentation in the development of corporate law rules. The recent 
assertion that no meaningful interstate competition exists for out-of-state incorporations 
detracts from the market-based arguments these scholars invoke to refute the 
prescriptions of others who advocate national standards of corporate conduct. The dearth 
of competition also weakens these same scholars’ arguments that the federal system of 
corporate law has led to the development of efficient or optimal corporate law rules. 
For regulatory competition actually to impact the development of corporate law in a 
manner that properly balances management and shareholder interests, Delaware must 
have a rival. Only the federal government can offer an alternative regulatory scheme that 
can compete with Delaware for the public’s acceptance. This Article’s vision of 
regulatory competition departs sharply from the model of horizontal competition that 
dominates corporate law scholarship. In this view, regulatory competition is not driven by 
the pursuit of additional corporate charters or franchise fees. Instead, the rival regulators 
compete for the public’s confidence and concomitant regulatory authority and power. 
In this paradigm, voters play the primary role in achieving a desirable balance 
between federal and state power in corporate regulation. If the public disapproves of the 
actions of federal regulators in a substantive area, voters can elect representatives at the 
national level who will defer to states on such issues. In the context of corporate 
regulation, if Delaware, the dominant state for corporate law, regulates corporate affairs 
competently, then Delaware and other states should continue to enjoy broad regulatory 
authority. Conversely, if the public loses confidence in the existing regulatory regime, 
voters would be expected to pressure Congress to adopt laws that impose more 
appropriate standards. Such public pressure might lead Congress to preempt certain 
provisions of state corporate law. Such pressure may also lead states to take measures to 
forestall preemption by modifying state law to more closely comport with the demands of 
the voting public. 
Delaware’s response to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley suggests that Congress has 
the ability to prod Delaware to adopt corporate law rules preferred by voters, without 
resorting to wholesale replacement of state law with federal law. The Act has been 
Law as Product]; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993) [hereinafter ROMANO, 
GENIUS] (race-to-the-top). 
 6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002); see also, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen 
& Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002). 
 7. Bebchuck & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 580-82. 
 8. See id.; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 701. 
 9. Kahan and Kamar, supra note 6. 
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described as “the most far-reaching reforms of American corporate practices since the 
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”10 Unlike the reforms of the Roosevelt era, the Act 
departs from the securities laws’ traditional model of disclosure regulation and mandates 
corporate governance reforms that previously had been the exclusive province of the 
states. Among other interventions, the Act forbids all corporate loans to directors and 
executive officers and dictates the composition and responsibilities of the audit 
committee of the board of directors.11 With these provisions, the Act displaces some of 
the basic tenets of state corporate law. 
The realistic threat of federal preemption posed by Sarbanes-Oxley seems to have 
influenced Delaware’s judiciary. In recent decisions, its judges have taken a firmer stance 
against directors when evaluating shareholders’ fiduciary duty claims. It is likely that 
Sarbanes-Oxley and other corporate reform proposals of national scope prompted or 
contributed to this shift in Delaware jurisprudence. Delaware’s judicially-led reforms 
suggest that limited preemption of state law can play an important role in the 
development of corporate law at the state level. This dynamic, if fostered, can afford the 
national citizenry a voice in shaping the corporate law rules devised by a non-
representative body of policy-makers, which, in turn, could lead to a more democratic 
and more principled regulatory scheme. 
In this Article, I argue that the recently renewed federal engagement in corporate 
law issues should be welcomed and sustained. However, in contrast to other proposals, I 
do not advocate wholesale federal preemption or the development of an optional federal 
regulatory scheme.12 Instead, I urge a sustained vigilance from Congress and a 
willingness to take limited preemptive measures when state corporate law rules fall short 
in providing adequate protection for investors. 
Part II reviews the longstanding debate on the corporate law race and, like other 
recent commentators, concludes that no race exists at all. Part III reviews current thinking 
about corporate federalism. Part IV proposes an alternative model of vertical regulatory 
competition, and argues that it represents a better paradigm for analyzing regulatory 
competition in the corporate law arena. Part V describes the political factors that led 
Congress to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley. Part VI explains how the Delaware courts have led 
the state’s response to Sarbanes-Oxley’s preemptive threat. It analyzes recent 
developments in Delaware law and argues to the federal preemptive threat prompted 
them. 
II. THE “RACE” DEBATE 
A. The Modern Debate 
For almost thirty years, academics have debated about whether competition among 
states for corporate charters has precipitated a race to the top or a race to the bottom in 
 10. Elisabeth Bulmiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at 
A1 (quoting President George W. Bush). 
 11. See the Act, §§ 301, 402 and infra text at notes 99-106. 
 12. See, e.g., NADER ET AL., supra note 5, at 63-71; Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to 
Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 143-44 (2001) (advocating an “opt-in” federal 
takeover law with choice controlled by shareholders). 
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corporate law. The debate is central to corporate legal scholarship, for at its essence it is a 
debate about the proper substance of corporate law rules. In our federal system of 
corporate law, state governments set the rules governing the relationships among the 
primary participants in the corporate enterprise: directors, officers and investors. Each 
state has its own corporate statute and a corporation may incorporate under the laws of 
any state, regardless of whether it owns assets or conducts operations in that state. Under 
the “internal affairs doctrine,” it is the law of the selected state that governs all disputes 
regarding a corporation’s internal affairs, regardless of the forum in which such disputes 
are litigated.13 Although the federal securities laws and other federal laws impose 
significant limitations on corporate operations, the U.S. has no federal corporate statute.14
Because corporations pay franchise taxes and other fees to the states in which they 
incorporate, many commentators have argued that states compete for corporate charters 
and the tax revenues they generate.15 That more than half of all publicly-traded 
corporations incorporate in Delaware leads most to conclude that Delaware has “won” 
this competition.16 The “race” debate thus centers on determining why Delaware has won 
the race for corporate charters and, more importantly, whether the legal rules generated as 
a result of this race are the appropriate ones. 
Race-to-the-bottom theorists argue that regulatory competition has had a negative 
impact on the development of corporate law.17 William Cary most forcefully articulated 
this view. Cary argued that Delaware, in its zeal to maintain its primacy as the favored 
state of incorporation, adopted legal rules that favor managers at the expense of 
shareholders.18 He asserted that because corporate managers enjoy exclusive power to 
select or change the state of incorporation, Delaware had declared it to be the “public 
policy of the State” to adopt legal rules that managers desired.19 Implicit in Cary’s 
argument is the premise that government regulation is necessary to prevent corporate 
managers from exploiting shareholders who exercise little meaningful control over the 
modern corporate enterprise. Having concluded that the federal system discourages such 
active regulation, Cary urged Congressional legislation as the only means to effect the 
regulatory regime he viewed as essential to maintain the proper balance of power among 
managers, shareholders and other corporate constituents.20 He thus proposed the 
establishment of federal minimum standards of corporate conduct that would apply to 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971); see also McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 
A.2d 206, 218-19 (Del. 1987) (declining to apply Delaware law to a dispute involving a Panamanian 
corporation). 
 14. Despite Congress’s constitutional authority under the commerce clause to regulate corporations 
engaged in interstate commerce, under the internal affairs doctrine a delineation has been established by which 
Congress regulates only what is understood to be external corporate affairs, such as securities trading, labor 
relations and consumer protection, and leaves internal governance matters exclusively to the states. See Mark J. 
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 596-98 (2003) (discussing the contours of the internal 
affairs doctrine). 
 15. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 5, at 665-66; Winter, supra note 5, at 253. 
 16. See, e.g., BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 61 (5th ed. 
2003) (concluding that Delaware has “won” the corporate law race); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
CORPORATIONS 36-38 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing reasons for Delaware’s primacy). 
 17. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 5, at 666, 670. 
 18. Id. at 670-71. 
 19. Id. at 663 (quoting Law of December 31, 1963, ch. 218 [1963] 54 Del. Laws 724). 
 20. Id. at 700-03. 
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large American corporations.21
Defenders of the corporate federal system (referred to here as corporate federalists) 
argue that the very interstate competition that Cary so excoriated, has led instead to a 
“race-to-the-top” in corporate law.22 These theorists, led by Ralph Winter, agree with 
Cary that the federal system discourages active regulation of corporations, but they 
embrace this deregulatory bias as the legitimate result of the corporate law race.23 Race-
to-the-top theorists maintain that market forces are sufficient to prevent excessive 
managerial self-dealing and opportunism.24 They take the market-based defense of the 
federal system a step further by arguing that not only do conventional market forces rein 
in management excess, but that a competitive market for corporate law works to ensure 
that states will adopt legal rules that appeal to managers and shareholders alike.25
Thus, Winter argued, if Delaware law permitted managers to profit at the expense of 
shareholders, earnings of Delaware corporations would lag behind those of similar 
corporations chartered in other states.26 This would result in lower stock prices for 
Delaware corporations, increasing their capital costs and weakening their position in the 
product market, ultimately driving stock prices still lower and making such corporations 
attractive takeover targets.27 Race-to-the-top theorists thus conclude that market forces 
require corporate managers to seek out legal rules that are attractive to investors, which in 
turn encourages states to adopt legal rules that “optimize the shareholder-corporation 
relationship.”28 Thus, in the view of race-to-the-top scholars, Delaware’s laissez faire 
approach to corporate governance is superior to the interventionist model preferred by 
race-to-the-bottom theorists, simply because this laissez faire approach has “won” a 
vigorous competition among all states to attract the most corporate charters.29
B. The Reality 
Despite the longevity of the race debate, recent empirical studies demonstrate the 
fallacy of the fundamental assumption upon which the great debate rests—that states 
actively compete for corporate charters. In separate studies, Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf 
Hamdani, and Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar have asserted that the interstate 
competition which has been credited with fueling the corporate law race is largely 
illusory.30 These commentators show that not only is Delaware the clear leader in 
chartering publicly-traded corporations, but that no other state serves as a credible rival to 
Delaware in attracting charters from out-of-state corporations.31
 21. Id. at 701. 
 22. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 5, at 275-76; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 212-15; 
ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 16-24. 
 23. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 5, at 275. 
 24. See id. at 262-66; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that market forces 
drive managers “to act as if they had investors’ interests at heart”); ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 86-88. 
 25. Winter, supra note 5, at 253; ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 15-32. 
 26. Winter, supra note 5, at 256. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 6, 214-15; Romano, Law as Product, supra note 
5, at 280-81. 
 30. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 579-82; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 724-35. 
 31. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 724-35. 
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It is common knowledge that Delaware is the state of incorporation for more than 
half of all publicly-traded companies.32 Yet, the true extent of Delaware’s dominance in 
the market for corporate charters becomes apparent only when the field is defined as the 
market for “out-of-state” incorporations. With the market so defined Delaware’s market 
share increases to 85%.33 In addition, several factors protect Delaware from being 
displaced from its dominant position by other states. Much of the value that Delaware’s 
legal system offers corporations stems from the large number of other firms that choose 
to incorporate there. For example, Delaware’s extensive body of corporate law decisions 
developed only because of the volume and diversity of cases presented to its courts.34 In 
addition, Delaware’s institutional infrastructure, including its specialized court system, 
expert judiciary, and specialized bar would be difficult for other states to readily 
duplicate. These advantages work together to protect Delaware’s dominant position.35 As 
a result, Delaware has no meaningful competition in the market for out-of-state 
incorporations.36
In addition to Bebchuk’s and Hamdani’s insights, Professors Kahan and Kamar 
argue that contrary to the central assumption in the corporate race debate, other states are 
not making serious efforts to compete with Delaware for corporate charters.37 Kahan and 
Kamar analyzed the corporate franchise tax and fee structures of all states, and concluded 
that states other than Delaware stand to gain little economically from attracting additional 
incorporations.38 For example, Nevada, the so-called “Delaware of the West,” earns 
marginal annual revenues of only $26,200 from the eighteen companies that went public 
as Nevada corporations between 1996 and 2000.39
By persuasively demonstrating the absence of interstate competition in the 
development of corporate law, these recent studies detract from the standard arguments 
of corporate federalists who advance and defend the free-market approach to corporate 
law embodied in the states’ enabling corporate law codes.40 Because there is no 
meaningful interstate competition for corporate charters, competition could not have 
affected the development of corporate law in the way that corporate federalists posit. 
Thus, corporate federalists’ defense of the states’ enabling corporate codes must rest on 
other grounds. 
The absence of vigorous competition among states for corporate charters does not by 
itself establish that fundamental problems exist in the corporate law rules that states 
created. It is one thing to refute the assertion that interstate competition exists, and has 
led to optimal corporate law rules, and quite another to demonstrate that the existing rules 
 32. Delaware is home to 57.75% of all publicly-traded corporations and 59% of the Fortune 500 
corporations, excluding financial firms. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 568. 
 33. Id. at 556, 578. 
 34. Id. at 586; see also Romano, Law as Product, supra note 5, at 280; ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 
44. 
 35. See generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757 (1995) (discussing network externalities). 
 36. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 593-96. 
 37. Kahan & Kamar, supra, note 6, at 724. 
 38. Id. at 684-85. 
 39. Id. at 693. 
 40. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 214-15; ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 85-
117. 
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are flawed. Nonetheless, there are valid reasons to suspect that certain problems will 
persist in corporate law when the rules are established through a political process that 
managerial interests dominate. Such problems are likely to arise with respect to three 
broad categories of issues: (1) management’s ability to retain its powers and privileges 
(i.e., election of directors and takeover defenses); (2) managerial self-dealing (i.e., 
executive compensation, conflicts of interest, unfair dealing with minority interests); and 
(3) interests of stakeholders and society (i.e., rights of creditors, employees and 
externalities).41
Simply put, when legal rules require a balancing of competing interests, a lack of 
input in the regulatory process from all concerned interests makes it unlikely that an 
optimal balance will be achieved. An extensive body of literature explores the legal 
problems that arise in the areas identified above.42 Part VI of this Article examines 
corporate law doctrine in Delaware and highlights many of the problems implicated here. 
III. HORIZONTAL VS. VERTICAL REGULATORY COMPETITION 
A. Horizontal Competition 
Traditional corporate law theory has focused almost exclusively on the purported 
benefits of horizontal regulatory competition while ignoring another important federalist 
ideal: that state governments would compete with the federal government for regulatory 
power. A core argument of corporate federalists is that the federal (state-based) system 
enhances the development of corporate law through reliance on competitive mechanisms 
that federal intervention would hamper. These theorists argue that the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia function as regulatory laboratories that facilitate innovation in the 
development of rules that improve the substance of corporate law.43 When competing 
states observe successful experiments in innovative states, they adopt similar rules which 
leads to the optimal corporate legal rules prevailing throughout the nation.44
Corporate federalists also argue that national regulation as advanced by Cary and 
others would disrupt this ideal competitive process because the federal government 
would enjoy monopoly power, nullifying the ability of competitive forces to advance 
optimal legal rules.45 Finally, opponents of national-level regulation argue that such 
regulation would not likely do better than state law in protecting shareholders as 
Congress is just as susceptible to business lobbying as state legislatures.46
Some scholars have challenged the corporate federalists’ unvarnished view of the 
superiority of state-level regulation in corporate law. William Bratton and Joseph 
McCahery assert that the economic theory that underlies the corporate federalist model 
 41. Professor Bebchuk has explained why these are the most likely problem areas for corporate law in the 
current federal system. See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1441, 1458-94. 
 42. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 624-
40 (1997); Victor Brudney & Robert C. Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 998, 
1022-42 (1981). 
 43. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 5, at 280-81; ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 5. 
 44. ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 5. 
 45. See Romano, Law as Product, supra note 5, at 281. 
 46. See id. at 230. 
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has been significantly qualified by economists.47 They point out that Charles Tiebout’s 
model of horizontal regulatory competition sought only to demonstrate the superiority of 
local level determination of government expenditures on public goods and services, such 
as police protection, public schools, and swimming pools.48 Legal scholars subsequently 
integrated Tiebout’s model into legal literature as they sought to expand the model to 
apply to the “production” of government regulation.49 The Tiebout model thus became a 
basis for the defense of current system state-based corporate regulation.50 However, most 
public economists now concur that the Tiebout model is burdened by too many 
unrealistic assumptions to predict reliably the superiority of local level regulation over 
national regulation.51 Therefore, public economists have either rejected or significantly 
modified the Tiebout model to account for its weaknesses.52 Based on this newer 
economic learning, Bratton and McCahery conclude that the superiority of local level 
regulation cannot be assumed based solely on theories of horizontal competition.53
Despite the Tiebout model’s lack of robustness, legal theories derived from this 
outmoded model continue to thrive among legal academics.54 For example, recent 
critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley cite the purported benefits of horizontal competition in their 
assault on the evolution of “federalized” corporate governance standards.55 
Unfortunately, because of their exclusive focus on illusory state-to-state competition and 
their disregard for the importance of vertical competition, these corporate federalists fail 
to acknowledge the potential benefits of competition from the federal sector. 
B. Vertical Competition 
Despite its curious absence from the debate on corporate law competition, the 
concept of vertical competition was central to the framers’ vision of the federalist 
system.56 The dual regulatory authority of federal and local governments was part of the 
 47. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: 
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 205 (1997) [hereinafter, Bratton & 
McCahery, Devolutionary Federalism]. 
 48. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). 
 49. Bratton & McCahery, Devolutionary Federalism, supra note 47 at 205-06. 
 50. Id. at 209. 
 51. Id. at 222-25. 
 52. See id. at 243-44. 
 53. Bratton & McCahery, Devolutionary Federalism, supra note 47, at 260-61. 
 54. See id. at 219-22. 
 55. Stephen Bainbridge asserts that: 
[c]ompetitive federalism promotes liberty as well as shareholder wealth. When firms may freely 
select among multiple competing regulators, oppressive regulation becomes impractical. If one 
regulator overreaches, firms will exit its jurisdiction and move to one that is more laissez faire. In 
contrast, when there is but a single regulator, exit is no longer an option and an essential check 
on excessive regulation is lost. 
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 31. Larry Ribstein similarly argues that “[f]ederalizing corporate governance 
should be approached with caution. The state-based system of regulating corporate governance can be 
considered one of the main strengths of the U.S. capital markets.” Ribstein, supra note 4, at 58. 
 56. See Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 329, 338-45 (2003) (discussing the Federalist papers); see also George D. Brown, New 
Federalism’s Unanswered Question: Who Should Prosecute State and Local Officials for Political Corruption?, 
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 434-35 (2003) (discussing federalism concepts). 
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framers’ design. They anticipated that such a system would enable the public to “giv[e] 
most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due.”57 Thus, the original 
federalists envisioned that state and federal governments would compete to persuade the 
public as to which was better suited to regulate in a particular field.58 The public would 
observe which level of government exercised regulatory authority in a field and could 
evaluate that regulator’s performance. If dissatisfied with the dominant regulator’s 
performance, voters could lobby for intervention from an alternative regulator and 
thereby shift regulatory authority from the states to the federal government or vice versa. 
In contrast to modern federalists’ unyielding attacks on federal regulation, the 
original federalists were more circumspect about the proper limits of federal power. In 
James Madison’s view, any expansion of federal power in response to voters’ demands 
would bear legitimacy. He argued that: 
[i]f . . . the people should in [the] future become more partial to the federal than 
to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and 
irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their 
antecedent propensities.59
In the modern context, the model of vertical regulatory competition predicts that if 
states regulate corporations competently, federal deference to state authorities would be 
politically popular and national politicians who eschewed extensive federal regulation 
would be elected to federal office. Conversely, if states failed to regulate adequately or 
permitted a regulatory void, the federal government could step in and win public 
confidence by filling the existing void with regulation that voters demand. In such a 
context, federal regulation would become politically expedient and politicians who 
supported such regulation could expect to be re-elected.60
In a contemporaneous work, Mark Roe also argues that the federal government is 
Delaware’s main competitor in the corporate law realm.61 Roe argues that the federal 
government reserves for itself those areas of corporate law that it wishes to regulate, 
leaving the states to regulate the remainder of the field.62 Whenever the federal 
government disapproves of state policy, it may, and often does, preempt state law.63 Roe 
also observes that the federal government can influence Delaware law through many 
mechanisms that fall short of preemption.64
Roe’s arguments are consonant with this Article’s description of federal corporate 
reform legislation provoking reform at the state level. However, Roe refrains from 
offering a normative evaluation of the proper role of national regulation in the 
development of corporate law. In contrast to Roe’s agnosticism, this Article asserts that 
 57. Pettys, supra note 56, at 341 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison)). 
 58. Id. at 333. 
 59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison), in 2 THE FEDERALIST: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, 
WRITTEN IN FAVOUR OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AS AGREED UPON BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 84, 85-86 (2001). 
 60. See Pettys, supra note 56, at 345-53 (reviewing the history of the American public’s favor and 
disfavor for federal regulation). 
 61. Roe, supra note 14, at 591-93. 
 62. Id. at 596-98. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 601-07. 
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adherence to basic democratic principles justifies federal intervention, particularly when 
such intervention represents a legislative response to public demands for significant legal 
reform. 
IV. TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF VERTICAL REGULATORY COMPETITION 
Recent scholarship demonstrates a lack of interstate competition for corporate 
charters, exposing a gap in modern theories of regulatory competition in corporate law. 
This Article’s proposed model of vertical competition attempts to fill that gap. Vertical 
regulatory competition is not driven by a regulator’s desire to maximize revenues, but by 
the quest for popular legitimacy and its attendant authority to regulate.65 The rival 
regulators (the state and federal governments) compete with one another for the 
confidence of voters who will reward, with their votes, those politicians whom they 
perceive as protecting their interests, and penalize those who do not. This model of 
regulatory competition better explains recent developments in corporate law, in which the 
Delaware judiciary is apparently seeking to regain public confidence by reforming its law 
as part of a bid to prevent further federal preemption. 
A. Advantages 
The vertical model has normative appeal because it recognizes the need for 
policymakers to consider a broader range of interests than the horizontal competition 
model deems important. As Cary and others have observed, a policymaking process 
characterized by horizontal competition encourages policy makers to appeal to 
management interests, to the exclusion of the interests of all other corporate constituents, 
because management initiates the selection of the state of incorporation and retains 
control over any reincorporation decision.66
The race-to-the-top paradigm advanced by Winter and others relegates investors to a 
reactive role and accepts their exclusion from participation in the policy debate when 
legal rules are crafted. In Winter’s paradigm, the only role for shareholders in the 
regulatory process is that of ratifying or rejecting management’s choice by choosing 
whether or not to invest in a corporation chartered in a particular state. Under this model, 
investors face a “take it or leave it” proposition. Because of the convergence of modern 
corporate law rules, the law of all states is essentially the same and investors are deprived 
of any meaningful choice. 
In contrast, the presence of vertical competition pushes policy-makers at both the 
state and federal level to give greater consideration to the interests of investors and 
broader societal issues. Nationally dispersed shareholders lack direct political influence 
in Delaware, while management interests are well-represented.67 At the national level, in 
 65. See Pettys, supra note 57, at 332-33. 
 66. See Cary, supra note 5. 
 67. Many scholars have documented how Delaware’s corporate bar controls the process of amending the 
state’s corporate code. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV 469, 506-09 (1987) (describing the reasons for the Delaware bar’s 
dominance of the regulatory process); ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 28-31 (discussing Macey’s and 
Miller’s analysis); Law for Sale, supra note 5, at 868 (describing the role of the drafting committee of the 1967 
Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission); Ernest Folk, III, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law 
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contrast, representatives of shareholder interests, can participate directly in policy 
debates.68 Sophisticated and organized aggregations of shareholders can and do lobby 
Congress and the SEC to ensure that shareholder interests are considered. Labor unions, 
public pension funds, and trade groups such as the Council for Institutional Investors 
have the wherewithal to make a persuasive case to Congress and the SEC.69
As a policy matter, encouraging vertical competition is preferable to promoting 
horizontal competition among states. Federal engagement provides voters throughout the 
country an opportunity to persuade Congress to preempt those state law provisions that 
lack popular support. This dynamic allows investors to influence state corporate law, if 
only indirectly. A posture of absolute federal deference to state regulators would deprive 
citizens of this power, enhancing management’s dominance of the state regulatory 
process. 
B. Objections 
1. The Federal Constraint is too Weak 
Several commentators have acknowledged the preemptive threat’s disciplining 
effect on Delaware. Yet, they generally conclude that the federal constraint is too weak 
and sporadic to be relied upon to affect state law significantly.70 For example, Bebchuk 
and Hamdani argue that the federal constraint is “hardly a tight one” and that it requires 
the federal government to identify corporate governance arrangements that harm 
Draftsman, 42 CONN. BAR J. 409, 410-12 (describing the composition of the Delaware Corporate Law 
Committee). 
 68. The roster of witnesses at the Senate hearings on Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates the breadth of 
perspectives available to national policy makers. The witnesses included Paul Volcker (former federal reserve 
chairman), Charles Bowsher (former comptroller general), Richard Breeden (former SEC chairman), Arthur 
Levitt (former SEC chairman), John Biggs (chairman of TIAA-CREF), Sarah Teslik (executive director of the 
Council of Institutional Investors), and Professors Joel Seligman and John Coffee. Report of the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs to accompany S. 2673 July 3, 2002, S. REP. No. 107-205 
(2002), reprinted in HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE (2003 ed.). 
 69. These groups lobby the SEC from time to time to adopt new rules to enhance shareholder rights. For 
example, in response to prodding from institutional investors and labor unions, the SEC adopted a rule requiring 
mutual funds to disclose their proxy votes to investors. See Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and 
Proxy Voting Records by Registered Investment Companies, Securities Act Release 33-8188, available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2004); 17 CFR Pts. 239, 249, 270, 274. The SEC also 
recently proposed a new “shareholder access” rule which would, in certain circumstances, allow significant 
shareholders to include their own nominees for the board of directors in the management proxy statement. See 
Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003), 
available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). The SEC has received 
thousands of comment letters on the shareholder access proposal from groups as disparate as the Business 
Roundtable, state bar associations, labor unions, and public pension fund managers. These comment letters are 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903.shtml (last visited on Apr. 7, 2004). A similar debate 
occurred on the merits of the mutual fund disclosure rules. Comment letters on this proposal are available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). 
 70. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 604-05; but see Roe, supra note 14, at 596-98 (departing 
from general skepticism about the federal government’s ability to effect change in state law without resorting to 
preemption). 
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shareholders and seek to correct them.71 Bratton and McCahery similarly argue that 
political barriers make it difficult for shareholder groups to influence national policy, and 
that Delaware, when threatened, easily defuses the federal threat through minimal 
concessions to shareholders.72
The vertical competition model emphasizes Congress’s ability, through incremental 
action, to impact law significantly at the state level. Indeed, recent developments in 
Delaware corporate law show that commentators may have underestimated the latent 
power of the preemptive threat and misgauged the limited precision with which Congress 
must act to evoke a significant state-level response. By engaging in quite limited 
preemption, the Act, along with other national reform proposals, has significantly 
influenced the development of state law. Congress did not need to precisely identify all of 
the flaws in state corporate law and systematically address them. To effect state-level 
reform, Congress merely needed to demonstrate that it was willing to exercise its 
constitutional authority to preempt state corporate law. Even though as a matter the 
exercise of federal preemptive power in the corporate realm has been episodic, it need not 
remain so. By continuing to scrutinize and evaluate corporate affairs, the federal 
government can maintain its disciplinary role. 
To sustain vertical competition, federal regulators must remain willing to intervene 
when the public becomes dissatisfied with the state regulatory regime. Prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley, the federal government eschewed dictating corporate governance standards and 
instead sought to regulate corporate conduct through an awkward amalgamation of tax 
policy and securities law disclosure requirements.73 The corporate scandals sparked 
public outrage which forced the federal government into a mode of direct regulation. This 
development disrupted the stagnant environment in which modern corporate rules had 
evolved. 
2. Delaware’s Dominance Lacks Legitimacy 
A stronger critique of the advocacy for constrained and limited federal preemption 
rests on the argument that scant justification exists for allowing a small state such as 
Delaware to dictate the law on issues having a significant impact on the national 
economy.74 Thus, a complete shift of regulatory authority from the states to the federal 
government is preferable to the limited preemption advanced here. Although there is 
some appeal to this argument, several factors caution against replacing state law with a 
federal incorporation scheme. 
Because of the states’ historical role in the development of corporate law, 
considerable expertise and experience in grappling with corporate law issues is vested in 
 71. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 604-05. 
 72. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and 
Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1900-03 (1995). 
 73. For example, in 1992, the SEC overhauled regulations on executive compensation disclosure in an 
effort to better inform shareholders on the issue. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. Pts. 228, 
229, 240, and 249 (2002). Congress also vainly attempted to rein in perceived excesses in executive 
compensation through amendments to the tax code. See I.R.C. §§ 162(m), 280G (1991). 
 74. Cf. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 1009, 1105 (1997) (discussing Delaware’s precarious position as a small state providing national legal 
rules). 
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state authorities. State-based law and jurisprudence have considerable value to businesses 
and lawyers representing sunk costs that may be squandered if federal law entirely 
replaced state law. Furthermore, there are some advantages to local-level regulation even 
in the absence of horizontal regulatory competition. Local chartering offers advantages in 
terms of cost and convenience that a federal regime could not match. States may be more 
responsive to citizen concerns than the federal government, and opportunities for 
experimentation afforded by the state-centered system should be preserved where 
possible. Although this attribute has been oversold by corporate federalists, some useful 
corporate reforms are made possible because of the ability of multiple jurisdictions to 
experiment with changes in the law.75
More importantly, the state regulatory regime can continue to serve as a regulatory 
“safety valve.” If federal regulation fails due to corruption or regulatory capture, the 
state-centered system provides an alternative venue for addressing future problems. The 
importance of this safety valve can be shown by analogy to the securities enforcement 
regime. When New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought enforcement actions 
against the major Wall Street investment banks and brokerage houses, he exposed 
rampant analyst fraud on Wall Street and ultimately prodded the SEC into action.76 His 
investigation led to a $1.4 billion settlement among the banks, the SEC, New York, and 
other states.77 Less than one year later, Spitzer again exposed systemic fraud in the 
mutual fund industry.78 Spitzer’s actions and those of other state regulators have 
revitalized competition between state and federal regulators in securities enforcement.79 
Similarly, state regulation of corporations can back-stop federal regulation, if in the 
future voters become dissatisfied with federal enforcement of corporate governance 
standards. 
C. Summary 
In summary, allowing states to continue to regulate corporations appears to offer 
some benefits over a purely federalized scheme. Yet, for the reasons discussed above, 
states should not enjoy exclusive authority in this realm. Because Congress can influence 
state corporate law without preempting it entirely, a practical resolution for corporate 
reform seems to be closer Congressional scrutiny of corporate regulation, aided by 
limited preemption when necessary to correct for states’ propensity to place the interests 
of managers above other corporate constituents in crafting corporate law. 
 75. One example is the creation of the limited liability company, a new entity created by states to provide 
the benefits of partnership tax treatment and corporate limited liability within a single entity. 
 76. See Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Firms are Ready to Pay $1 Billion in 
Fines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1. 
 77. See Finding Fraud on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A28. 
 78. See Landon Thomas, Jr., SEC Putting Mutual Funds Under Scrutiny on Late Trading, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 2003, at C1. 
 79. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United 
States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 519-24 (2003) (discussing the resurgence of state securities 
regulators). 
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V. SARBANES-OXLEY: THE FEDERAL PREEMPTIVE THREAT 
Examining the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s impact on the development of state corporate 
law offers an opportunity to evaluate whether the threat of federal preemption actually 
works the way the vertical model of regulatory competition would predict. This Section 
demonstrates how public dissatisfaction with state-based corporate regulation prodded 
Congress to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley which preempts certain provisions of state law. The 
following Section examines Delaware’s response to Sarbanes-Oxley. 
A. Corporate Scandals 
The widespread corporate governance scandals revealed in late 2001 through 2002 
followed on the heels of the technology bubble bust and exacerbated a prolonged bear 
stock market. The political pressure resulting from the scandals led Congress to enact 
Sarbanes-Oxley. The corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and others 
emerged amidst a legal environment of judicial deference to corporate directors and 
officers.80 The prevailing legal regime provided little deterrence, and few effective means 
for shareholders to redress corporate wrongdoing.81 The wisdom of the states’ laissez-
faire approach to corporate governance became more dubious with each unfolding 
scandal. 
The scandals evoked broad public dissatisfaction with the existing corporate 
regulatory regime.82 As a result, Congress and other federal regulators were compelled to 
address the perceived problems.83 This popular pressure for more extensive corporate 
regulation was significant, as it empowered Congress to encroach significantly on 
traditional state law terrain for the first time since the Great Depression. 
After Enron’s bankruptcy in December 2001, political pressure for federal corporate 
law reform began to mount. Congress held a series of widely-publicized hearings 
featuring disgraced executives such as Enron’s Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay, along 
with newly minted heroes like Sherron Watkins.84 Soon thereafter, the Justice 
Department indicted Arthur Andersen for obstruction of justice for trying to cover up its 
role in Enron’s accounting irregularities.85 Federal lawmakers filed bills proposing 
 80. See infra Part VI.C. 
 81. Id. 
 82. A poll conducted in June 2002, revealed that 57% of Americans distrusted corporate executives. The 
same proportion of Americans believed that corporate scandals were a major problem for the nation. John 
Harwood, Americans Distrust Institutions in Poll, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2002, at A4. Despite his overall high 
approval ratings (67%), Americans disapproved of President Bush’s handling of corporate and financial market 
problems by a margin of 46% to 40%. Business Ties Now Bind Nation’s CEO—Many Americans Give the First 
M.B.A. President Poor Marks for Handling Corporate Scandals, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2002, at A4. 
 83. The appeal for federal reform represents an implicit rejection of state governments as the proper fora 
for corporate reform legislation, despite the states’ historical dominance in this area. See Robert B. Thompson 
& Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
859, 876 (2003) (observing that “almost no one is talking about state regulation or law to combat the corporate 
governance problems”). 
 84. See Greg Hitt, Senators Vent Frustration at Silence of Enron’s Lay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at A3; 
Tom Hamburger, Enron’s Watkins Describes ‘Arrogant’ Culture, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2002, at A3; Greg Hitt 
& Tom Hamburger, Skilling Denies He Misled Enron Officials, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at A3. 
 85. Andersen was indicted on March 14, 2002. See John R. Wilke, Top Prosecutor in Andersen, Enron 
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myriad corporate reforms, as erstwhile SEC chairman Harvey Pitt embarked on a reform 
effort aimed at restoring investor confidence.86 The New York Stock Exchange and 
Nasdaq also put forth significant corporate governance reform proposals with a national 
scope.87
Despite the flurry of Congressional activity, a federal corporate reform bill was far 
from a certainty.88 President Bush attempted to forestall such efforts with his own more 
limited reform proposals.89 Indeed, the Congressional proposals stalled until a second 
wave of scandals hit the presses in the early summer of 2002.90 The balance finally 
tipped in favor of sweeping corporate reform legislation when WorldCom revealed that it 
had overstated its profits by $3.8 billion.91 With mid-term Congressional elections 
looming, national politicians felt pressure to “do something” about corporate fraud. 
Fewer than three weeks after WorldCom’s announcement the corporate reform bill 
passed in both the House and the Senate.92 After an accelerated conference process, both 
houses of Congress approved the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which President Bush 
quickly signed into law on July 31, 2002.93
B. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Sarbanes-Oxley represents an amalgamation of corporate reform proposals that had 
drifted through the halls of Congress since the Enron debacle first came to light.94 The 
Act reformed regulation of the accounting industry,95 enhanced securities law disclosure 
Cases Plays for Keeps, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at A12. 
 86. See Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the 29th Annual Securities Regulation Institute, Jan. 23, 2002, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch536.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004); Harvey L. Pitt, How to 
Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at A18. 
 87. See Report of the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee (June 6, 2002), 
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-govreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2004); Proposed Amendments to 
Nasdaq Rules, Oct. 9, 2002, SR-NASD-2002-141, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/SR-NASD-
141_NASDAQ_Rule_filing.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2004). 
 88. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just 
Might Work), 35 U. CONN. L. REV. 915, 924-25 (2003) (describing the confluence of events that led Congress 
to enact Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 89. See Press Release, White House, President Announces Tough New Enforcement Initiatives for Reform 
(July 9, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020709-4.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2004); Jennifer Grossman, Commentary; It’s About Time for a Little Payback; Errant Execs Owe 
Us . . . and There’s a Way to Collect, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at B11. 
 90. These included scandals at Tyco, Adelphia, ImClone and WorldCom. 
 91. Jared Sandberg et al., WorldCom Admits $3.8 Billon Error in Its Accounting, WALL ST. J., June 26, 
2002, at A1. The extent of the fraud was later increased to $9 billion. See Deborah Solomon & Jared Sandberg, 
WorldCom’s False Profits Climb, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A3. 
 92. See Jonathan D. Glater & David Leonhardt, Corporate Conduct: The Impact; Both Sides Say Bill 
Addressing Business Fraud Is a First Step, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at C1 (stating that “[t]he two houses of 
Congress rushed to pass competing versions of the bill in recent weeks, saying they wanted to prevent repeats of 
the spectacular corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and others”); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Negotiators Agree 
on Broad Changes in Business Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at A1 (“The legislation has enjoyed 
extraordinary momentum in the last three weeks. But its outlook had been cloudy until mid-June,” when 
scandals at Tyco, Adelphia, and WorldCom made it risky for any politician to object to the measure.). 
 93. Bulmiller, supra note 10, at A1. 
 94. See Cunningham, supra note 88, at 918-19. 
 95. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §§ 101–08. 
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requirements,96 created a number of new white-collar crimes,97 and enhanced criminal 
and civil penalties for corporate fraud.98 In a marked departure from the securities laws’ 
traditional mode of disclosure regulation, the Act directly regulates corporate governance. 
In reaction to reports of abuse at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and others, the Act bans 
all corporate loans to officers and directors.99 In contrast to Congress’ bright line rule, 
most states permit such loans, subject only to vague standards embodied in the duty of 
loyalty.100
The Act also encroaches on state law by specifying requirements for the 
composition and conduct of the audit committee of the board of directors. The Act 
requires each public corporation to have an audit committee comprised solely of 
“independent” directors.101 The Act’s definition of independence is more stringent than 
that embodied in Delaware common law. To qualify as independent under the Act, a 
director cannot accept payment of any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fees 
other than director fees.102
In addition, the Act reallocates many key responsibilities from corporate 
management to the audit committee.103 It specifies that the audit committee must retain 
responsibility for appointing, compensating, and overseeing the work of the company’s 
independent auditor, and that the auditors must report directly to the committee.104 The 
Act also demands that the audit committee have the authority to hire independent 
advisers, such as lawyers and accountants, and that companies must provide the 
committee with the necessary funding to fulfill its newly-designated duties.105 Finally, 
the Act requires the audit committee to establish a reporting system for the receipt of 
confidential, anonymous reports from employees concerning questionable accounting or 
auditing matters.106 In contrast to the Act’s requirements, Delaware law affords the full 
board the authority to designate committees, with discretion to determine committee 
composition and to delegate (or withhold) authority to committees as it wishes.107
C. Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley 
A first wave of academic commentary has criticized the Act generally for the haste 
with which it was adopted,108 and more specifically for what some say is the ill-advised 
 96. Id. §§ 302, 401–09. 
 97. Id. §§ 802, 906, 1102-07. 
 98. Id. §§ 305, 804, 1105. 
 99. Id. § 402. 
 100. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (2002). 
 101. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301. 
 102. Id. Compare to case law discussed infra Part VI.C (discussing Delaware standards for director 
independence pre-Enron). The New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the Nasdaq 
stock market have also adopted more stringent standards for director independence further pressuring Delaware 
to conform its common law to the emerging national standards. See, e.g., Final NYSE Corporate Governance 
Rules, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
 103. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974). 
 108. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 88, at 917-23 (describing reforms as “modest”); Perino, supra note 
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step across the well-respected lines established by the internal affairs doctrine.109 These 
substantive critiques, however valid, gloss over an important point.110 The Act’s very 
adoption triggered an important reaction and initiated legal reforms with impact beyond 
its limited substantive provisions. When analyzed as part of the complex dynamic of 
vertical competition, the Act is properly viewed as a critical political response to public 
dissatisfaction with the states’ performance as virtually exclusive regulators of internal 
corporate affairs. 
VI. DELAWARE’S RESPONSE 
A. The Perceived Threat 
As the model of vertical regulatory competition would predict, the public outrage 
over the corporate scandals appears to have affected the Delaware judiciary, which is 
ever mindful of Congress’ preemptive power. In response, Delaware’s judiciary has taken 
the initiative to reform its state’s corporate law in an effort to forestall further federal 
preemption. This reform effort has been facilitated by the state’s open-ended, standards-
based jurisprudence which allows judges to adjust the law in response to external forces 
without having to explicitly acknowledge such efforts. 
Powerful parties in Delaware could suffer significantly in the event of broad federal 
preemption of state corporate law. Most obviously, uniform federal standards could erode 
Delaware’s relative appeal to corporate managers, resulting in the significant loss of 
franchise tax revenues.111 In addition, members of the Delaware bar and judiciary would 
personally feel the impact of federal preemption.112 Delaware lawyers rely heavily on 
revenues generated from serving as local Delaware counsel to corporations located 
throughout the country.113 These corporations consult Delaware practitioners due to their 
exclusive access to the Delaware courts and their expertise in Delaware corporate law. If 
federal corporate law were to supplant Delaware law, much of this expertise could be 
rendered moot. Adopting uniform federal standards would make corporate practitioners 
throughout the country prospective experts in the new federal corporate law, and could 
reduce or eliminate the need to regularly consult Delaware counsel. 
In addition, the Delaware judiciary’s power and prestige might wane if new federal 
statutes required corporations to litigate significant shareholder disputes in federal court 
anywhere in the country. Delaware state courts would not exercise jurisdiction over as 
many high-profile disputes and the judiciary’s prominence would diminish. With so 
4; John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990’s, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 269, 302-07 (2004) (criticizing the Act for failing to address the fundamental causes of the 
scandals). 
 109. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 26; Ribstein, supra note 4, at 57-59. 
 110. A comprehensive analysis of the substance of the Act is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this 
Article focuses on the Act’s potential impact on state corporate law. 
 111. Bebchuk and Hamdani estimate that 27% of Delaware’s annual tax revenues come from franchise tax 
revenues. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 581 n.66. 
 112. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 694-99 (discussing benefits to the Delaware bar from litigation 
centered in Delaware); see also Romano, Law as Product, supra note 5, at 278-79; Law for Sale, supra note 5, 
at 888-90. 
 113. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 6, at 694-99. 
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much at stake for so many players, it is not surprising that Delaware’s decision-makers 
are anxious about the federal preemptive threat.114
B. The Judicial Response 
The Delaware judiciary is well-situated to respond to the preemptive threat, perhaps 
better situated than the legislature or other state courts.115 The open-ended nature of 
Delaware jurisprudence has allowed its courts to respond swiftly and deftly to forestall 
federal action.116 Certain Delaware judges have acknowledged their perceived role as 
first-responders to the threat of federal preemption. These judges have publicly expressed 
concern with possible problems in state corporate jurisprudence revealed by Enron and 
other scandals, despite the fact that the largest frauds occurred at corporations chartered 
elsewhere. These same judges have suggested that unless states act quickly to address 
these weaknesses, the federal government may preempt their authority.117
Writing in early 2002, Delaware Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine predicted that “the 
Enron debate will create pressure on the current standards of state corporation law, 
and . . . participants in the policymaking process will identify what they perceive as 
inadequacies in that law, which they will cite as justifying a stronger role for federal 
regulation.”118 Acknowledging the importance of the federal-state competitive dynamic, 
he predicted that state policymakers “can be expected to be responsive to legitimate 
concerns.”119 He noted that such policymakers include state judges, like himself, “who 
play the leading role in formulating and enforcing the fiduciary duties of corporate 
directors and officers.”120
Norman Veasey, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, has revealed similar 
concerns about the federal preemptive threat. He has urged corporate directors to act 
more vigilantly in setting executive compensation, “not only as a guard against the 
intrusion of the federal government but as a guard against anything that might happen to 
 114. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990) (discussing 
various interest groups in Delaware and their dependence on the “capital asset” of the Delaware corporate law 
regime). Corporation service companies which facilitate the formation and legal maintenance of Delaware 
corporations by out-of-state corporations are another influential group in the development of Delaware law. For 
a discussion of the corporation service companies’ role in shaping Delaware’s 1967 statutory revisions, see Law 
for Sale, supra note 5, at 865. 
 115. Delaware’s legislature recently adopted a number of statutory amendments which expand the chancery 
court’s jurisdiction to assist plaintiffs seeking to bring actions against officers of Delaware corporations. These 
statutory revisions were recommended by the Delaware Bar Association in response to Enron and other recent 
events. See 18 CORP. COUNS. WKLY. 185, 185-86 (June 18, 2003). 
 116. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1908, 1925-28 (1998) (arguing that indeterminacy helps explain Delaware’s superior position in the 
corporate charter market); Rock, supra note 74, at 1016 (describing Delaware court decisions as “judgmental 
factual recitations . . .[that] sometimes impose legal sanctions, but surprisingly often do not”). 
 117. See, e.g., Roundtable, supra note 2, at 77 (quoting Chief Justice Veasey); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative 
Impact? Some Early Reflections on Corporate Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 
1372 (2002) (“Congress may even be tempted to consider federalizing key elements of corporate law . . .”). 
 118. Strine, supra note 117, at 1372. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1372-73. 
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them in court from a properly presented complaint.”121 Acknowledging the Delaware 
courts’ role in forestalling the preemptive threat, the chief justice bluntly stated: “[i]f we 
don’t fix it, Congress will, but I hope they’ve gone as far as they’re going to have to 
go.”122
Reflecting the tenor behind judicial pronouncements about the risk of federal 
preemption, recent Delaware decisions suggest a trend toward stricter judicial scrutiny of 
director decision-making. Since June of 2002, the Delaware Supreme Court has reversed 
chancery court decisions in favor of defendant directors, and ruled for the shareholder-
plaintiffs six times.123 This series of reversals represents a sharp departure from earlier 
patterns, in both the number of reversals and the number of pro-shareholder decisions.124 
Moreover, the supreme court’s jurisprudential shift has trickled down to the court of 
chancery, which apparently has taken heed of the supreme court’s message after such an 
unusual string of reversals.125
Ironically, the indeterminacy of Delaware law makes it impossible to demonstrate 
conclusively that the law has changed, or to identify the causes of any purported shift. 
The Delaware courts are famous for announcing new standards of conduct, while 
claiming that such standards have always existed.126 In spite of the hazards of 
 121. Roundtable, supra note 2, at 76. 
 122. Id. at 77. 
 123. See Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277 (Del. 2003); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 818 A.2d 
914 (Del. 2003); MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003); Saito v. McKesson 
HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113 (Del. 2002); Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Readers Digest Ass’n, Inc., 803 A.2d 
428 (Del. 2002); Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257 (Del. 2002). 
 124. By comparison, in 2000 the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed 4 court of chancery decisions and 
reversed 2 of them. In 2001, it reviewed 9 court of chancery decisions and reversed only 2. A search in the 
Westlaw “DE-CS” database for Delaware Supreme Court cases on corporate fiduciary duties revealed the 
following decisions: Parnes v. Bally Entertainment Corp. 788 A.2d 123 (Del. 2001) (affirming judgment for 
directors in action challenging the fairness of a merger); Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 788 A. 2d 111 (Del. 
2001) (affirming rejection of director’s claim for advancement of legal fees under indemnification by-law); 
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001) (reversing judgment for defendants based on exculpation 
defense because trial court had neglected to first conduct an entire fairness analysis); MCA, Inc. v. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 785 A.2d 625 (Del. 2001) (affirming denial of objecting plaintiffs’ motion to vacate a 
class action settlement); White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001) (affirming dismissal of derivative action 
against directors for improperly handling allegations of CEO’s sexual harassment of employees); Malpiede v. 
Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001) (affirming dismissal of duty of care claims based on exculpation defense); 
Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d 245 (Del. 2001) (affirming dismissal of shareholder action 
challenging validity of corporation’s poison pill); Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 
2001) (affirming dismissal of action challenging the fairness of a short-form merger); Rossdeutscher v. Viacom, 
Inc. 768 A.2d 8 (Del. 2001) (reversing the dismissal of contract claim in connection with rights issued in a 
merger but affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment claim); Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, Inc., 766 A.2d 
437 (Del. 2000) (affirming judgment for plaintiffs in duty of loyalty claim and affirming the denial of plaintiff’s 
claim for disgorgement of post-merger profits); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000) (reversing 
dismissal of minority shareholder’s claim challenging parent company’s sale of its subsidiary); Skeen v. Jo-Ann 
Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170 (affirming dismissal of claim for inadequate disclosure in a cashout merger); Brehm 
v. Eisner 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (affirming dismissal for failure to make demand but reversing the “with 
prejudice” aspect of the dismissal). 
 125. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re The Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). These cases are discussed infra at Part VI.D. 
 126. See Rock, supra note 74, at 1072-88 (rejecting doctrinal explanations of Delaware takeover law); 
Kamar, supra note 116, at 1914-18; Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty 
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speculating about what motivates judges in their decisionmaking,127 the following 
analysis seeks to analyze Delaware’s recent decisions in their political context. 
C. Delaware Law: Pre-Enron 
The Enron scandal prompted broad scrutiny of corporate law and launched 
Congressional hearings on corporate reform. Therefore, the scandal serves as a 
convenient dividing line for an analysis of recent trends in judicial decisionmaking. This 
section reviews the state of Delaware law before Enron and identifies the legal doctrines 
that made it difficult for shareholders to enforce the fiduciary duties of officers, directors, 
and controlling shareholders that are at the heart of corporate law. 
Before Enron, Delaware was the state where managers turned for assurances of 
minimal exposure to personal liability for mistakes, misjudgments, wrongdoing, or self-
dealing. As one corporate treatise states, “businesses that quest certainty of results, as 
well as a sympathetic and experienced ear to the problems of running a public 
corporation, are assured of finding it in Delaware.”128 A combination of legislative 
provisions, judge-made rules, and procedural mechanisms worked together to provide 
officers and directors a virtually impregnable shield from monetary liability for corporate 
misdeeds. 
Under standard notions of corporate governance embodied in state law, a 
corporation’s board of directors and its executive officers manage the affairs of the 
corporation.129 Shareholders’ governance rights are strictly limited to a nominal right to 
elect directors and the right to veto certain fundamental transactions. The limited 
governance role afforded shareholders has led to what many consider to be the central 
problem in modern corporate law: managing the tension caused by the separation of 
ownership from control in the large publicly-held corporation.130 The separation of 
ownership from control is said to create the classic agency problem. Managers are 
tempted by opportunities to shirk and steal.131 To deter management malfeasance and to 
provide shareholders a remedy for managerial shirking or stealing, the law imposes on 
managers, as agents of the corporation, the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. Until 
recently such shareholder protections were more theoretical than real. 
1. The Duty of Care 
Although Delaware has no statutory formulation of a director’s fiduciary duties, its 
courts have developed a standard of conduct against which to measure a director’s 
Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 
1609-14 (1994) (discussing doctrinal inconsistencies in Delaware takeover law). 
 127. Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 126, at 1626 (stating that “[p]redicting the course of Delaware law 
from prior case law is like watching clouds. They seem, at times, to take on recognizable shapes and forms, 
even to resemble something familiar. But you know that whatever shapes you think you see can vanish in a puff 
of wind.”). 
 128. COX & HAZEN, supra note 16, at 39. 
 129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2002). 
 130. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
114-15 (1968); see also BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 456. 
 131. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 33-34 (1986). 
JONES FINAL 5/13/2004  2:41 PM 
2004] Rethinking Corporate Federalism 647 
 
actions.132 Guth v. Loft, Inc. set forth an early formulation of a director’s fiduciary duty, 
as demanding of a director the duty “not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the 
corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would 
work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and 
ability might properly bring to it.”133 So stated, the duty of care appears to impose a 
significant burden on corporate managers. In reality, however, the state legislature and 
courts have fashioned a number of mechanisms that, until recently, eliminated any real 
threat of monetary liability for a breach of the duty of care. 
The business judgment rule significantly qualifies the general proposition that 
directors have a duty of care to the corporation. It imposes a rebuttable presumption that 
“in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”134 In most instances, the invocation of the business judgment rule suffices to 
insulate directors from liability to the corporation or its shareholders for losses that result 
from poor decision-making.135 Despite the broad protection the business judgment rule 
provides, it will not shield every director action from judicial scrutiny. Exceptions to the 
business judgment rule apply to decisions tainted by fraud, illegality, or conflict of 
interest. 
The most amorphous and unpredictable exception to the business judgment rule is 
for failure to take proper care in decision-making: the procedural duty of care.136 The 
famous Smith v. Van Gorkom137 decision invoked this standard, and concluded that the 
board of directors of TransUnion Corporation had failed to “act with informed reasonable 
deliberation” before approving the sale of the company.138 Although Van Gorkom raises 
the specter of potentially limitless personal liability for directors, the decision was an 
aberration in Delaware jurisprudence and has been almost uniformly criticized.139 No 
subsequent Delaware decision has premised director liability on a breach of the duty of 
care.140
Corporate management’s displeasure with Van Gorkom led Delaware’s legislature to 
adopt Section 102(b)(7), a provision that permits corporations to “exculpate,” or 
eliminate, directors’ monetary liability for the breach of the duty of care.141 Section 
 132. Id. at 123. 
 133. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 134. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 135. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (1996); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991); In re 
Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 136. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 16, at 191-95 (discussing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 
1985)). 
 137. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 138. Id. In Van Gorkom, the court opined that TransUnion’s board had failed to fulfill its duty of care 
because the board spent less than two hours considering the merger proposal, and approved the agreement 
without reading it, relying instead on a 20-minute oral presentation by the CEO who had secretly negotiated the 
merger. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Lawrence Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 485-91 
(2000) (criticizing Van Gorkom); see generally Symposium, Van Gorkom and the Corporate Board: Problem, 
Solution or Placebo, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002). 
 140. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE 150, n.45 (8th 
ed. 2002). 
 141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). See also KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 140, at 143. 
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102(b)(7) does not permit exculpation for breaches of duty of loyalty, acts or omissions 
not in good faith, or knowing violations of law.142 Despite these exceptions, the reality 
remains that if a corporation has adopted an exculpatory charter provision, its directors 
enjoy reasonable assurance that they will not incur personal liability for ordinary 
breaches of the duty of care.143 The scarcity of Delaware decisions holding directors 
liable for the breach of the duty of care,144 coupled with the right to exculpation, has led 
most commentators to conclude that the fiduciary duty of care, if not ephemeral, exists 
only as an aspirational and unenforceable standard.145
2. Duty of Loyalty 
The business judgment rule does not protect board decisions that are alleged to 
result from an officer’s, director’s, or controlling shareholder’s self-interest.146 
Ostensibly, the duty of loyalty holds such parties liable for unfairly enriching themselves 
at the corporation’s expense. As with the duty of care, the common law prohibition on 
managerial self-dealing has eroded over the years.147 Formerly, the dominant common 
law rule was that an action by a shareholder could void a corporate transaction with an 
interested director.148 This rule gave way to the modern “fairness” test, under which an 
interested transaction is not void if it is fair to the corporation.149 Delaware’s legislature 
further modified this common law rule when it adopted section 144, which provides that 
a transaction between a corporation and one of its officers or directors is not void or 
voidable solely because of the conflict, if the transaction is approved by a majority of the 
disinterested directors, a committee of disinterested directors, or by the shareholders, or if 
the transaction is fair to the corporation at the time of its approval.150
Disinterested director approval of a conflict of interest transaction has served as a 
reliable method for protecting potentially opportunistic corporate transactions from 
judicial scrutiny. Although the law is muddled, many cases have held that approval of a 
transaction by disinterested directors or shareholders results in application of the business 
judgment rule.151 Thus, directors often succeed in precluding judicial review of conflict 
of interest transactions by appointing a committee of independent directors to negotiate 
 142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
 143. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093-95 (Del. 2001) (upholding the dismissal of a 
duty of care claim or the grounds that a § 102(b)(7) provision precluded monetary recovery). 
 144. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of 
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-2000 (1968) (comparing the search for cases 
finding liability for breaches of duty of care to a search for a needle in a haystack). 
 145. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 131, at 124-26; KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 140, at 151-54. 
 146. CLARK, supra note 131, at 124. 
 147. Id. at 166-75. 
 148. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. 
LAW. 35, 36 (1966). 
 149. Id. at 39-40. But see Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: 
Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 662 (1992) (disputing 
Marsh’s analysis). 
 150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144. Other state corporate codes have similar provisions. See MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT, ch. 8, subch. F, §§ 8.60-8.63 (1969). 
 151. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, n.3 
(Del. 1987); In re Wheelabrator Tech. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
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and approve the terms of such transactions or by obtaining disinterested shareholder 
approval.152 Although Delaware courts have been more rigid in reviewing conflict of 
interest transactions between a corporation and its controlling shareholders, its courts 
have frequently accorded such transactions business judgment rule protection.153 But, in 
the controlling shareholder context, courts sometimes hold that disinterested director 
approval merely shifts the burden to the plaintiffs to show that the transaction is 
unfair.154 This burden-shifting rule has been applied consistently only in the context of 
cash-out mergers, when minority shareholders are forced to cash in their shares at a price 
dictated by controlling shareholder or its designated directors.155
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.156 announced the modern rule by which cash-out mergers 
are evaluated under an “entire fairness” standard.157 Although the Weinberger court 
found the controlling shareholder liable, it stated as dicta that the appointment of an 
independent committee to negotiate merger terms at arms-length was a “strong 
indication” that the resulting transaction satisfied the entire fairness standard.158
Outside of the cash-out merger context, the legal effect of disinterested director 
approval of controlling shareholder transactions remained unresolved. Courts sometimes 
review such conflicts under the business judgment rule and at other times apply the 
fairness test.159 The uncertainty regarding the appropriate application of these competing 
standards of review allows courts significant discretion in evaluating board conduct in 
any particular case. 
3. Procedural Protections 
Delaware courts have reinforced the substantive limitations on director liability with 
procedural barriers to plaintiffs’ claims against directors. In particular, the demand 
 152. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 153. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (applying business judgment rule to 
plaintiff’s challenge to subsidiary’s dividend to its parent); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 
1971) (applying business judgment rule to corporation’s real estate purchase from controlling shareholders). 
 154. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (articulating the entire fairness standard); see 
generally Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (applying burden shifting 
rule); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1222-23 (Del. 1998) (approval by disinterested directors 
shifts burden to plaintiffs); see also Cooke v. Oolie, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 609, 625 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that 
plaintiffs must show actual conflict of interest to rebut the presumption that the business judgment rule applies); 
Rabkin v. Olin Corp., 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 861-62 (1990) (describing the terms under which the burden of 
proof shifts with a special committee). 
 155. See generally Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711; Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117. The emergence of fairness as the 
unyielding standard of review in cash-out merger cases has a convoluted history. In Singer v. Magnavox Co., 
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), the Delaware Supreme Court imposed a business purpose requirement for all cash-
out mergers. Id. at 980. Seven years later, in Weinberger, the supreme court overturned Singer, abandoning the 
business purpose requirement for the current fairness rule. 
 156. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 157. Id. at 711. 
 158. Id. at 701 n.7. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116-17, reiterated the burden-shifting effect of disinterested 
committee approval of a cash-out merger transaction. In Kahn, the court held that the burden did not shift to 
plaintiffs because of evidence that the independent committee that negotiated the merger lacked independence 
and real bargaining power. Id. 
 159. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (affirming summary judgment for defendants in 
challenge to a recapitalization plan approved by an independent committee and shareholders). 
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requirement and the special litigation committee device frequently functioned to allow 
directors to dismiss derivative litigation on procedural grounds and thus avoid litigating 
the substantive merits of the shareholders’ claims.160
a. Demand Requirement 
Under the demand requirement, a shareholder may not bring a derivative action 
without first making a demand on the corporation’s directors to bring the suit directly, 
unless the plaintiff can show that such a demand would be futile.161 The demand 
requirement as initially interpreted by Delaware courts did not present a significant 
challenge to plaintiffs.162 This interpretation changed with the supreme court’s decision 
in Aronson v. Lewis.163 In Aronson, the court announced a two-part test, under which the 
court of chancery must determine whether “under the particularized facts alleged, a 
reasonable doubt is created that the directors are disinterested and independent [or] that 
the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business 
judgment.”164 If the complaint satisfies either condition, demand is excused and the case 
may proceed. 
b. Special Litigation Committees 
Despite the demand requirement’s protective power, instances occurred when courts 
excused demand based on futility.165 In this situation, a corporation’s directors would 
have an additional opportunity to avoid litigating the shareholders’ case on the merits by 
appointing a special committee of independent directors to review the litigation. Under 
this mechanism, interested directors (who had been adjudged disabled from objectively 
considering a demand) hand-picked the members of a special committee charged with 
evaluating the merits of the litigation and the corporation’s interest in continuing it.166 
The special litigation committee would then engage in an extensive investigation and 
produce a report that almost invariably concluded that continuing the litigation was 
against the corporation’s interests.167 The report of the special litigation committee then 
 160. COX & HAZEN, supra note 16, at 429 (asserting that “[t]he demand requirement . . . is the single most 
challenging hurdle that lies in the path of the derivative suit plaintiff”). 
 161. Del. Ch. Ct. R. P. 23.1. 
 162. COX & HAZEN, supra note 16, at 427-28. Before Aronson, plaintiffs satisfied the demand futility 
standard by simply naming a majority of directors as defendants in the litigation. 
 163. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 164. Id. at 814. The facts of Aronson show how this test erects a significant barrier. In Aronson, the 
plaintiffs challenged an employment agreement and loans to Fink, a former director and 47% stockholder. Id. at 
808. The plaintiffs had alleged that Fink dominated the board because he had personally selected the directors 
and through his voting power controlled the election process. Id. The court held these allegations insufficient to 
establish an inference of Fink’s domination and control. On remand, however, the court of chancery determined 
that demand excusal was appropriate under the newly announced standard. Lewis v. Aronson, 11 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 243 (1985). 
 165. For example, when all of the directors are implicated in the litigation or benefited from the alleged 
conflict of interest transaction. See, e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993). 
 166. See CLARK, supra note 131, at 645; James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 83, 
114 (1985). 
 167. CLARK, supra note 131, at 645. In some instances the special litigation committee would recommend 
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served as the basis of the corporation’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit.168
In Zapata v. Maldonado,169 the Delaware Supreme Court approved of this process 
and announced a two-step analysis for considering a special litigation committee’s 
motion to dismiss. First, the court was to consider the committee members’ 
independence, good faith, and bases for their recommendation.170 If satisfied as to these 
matters, the court could then engage in a second discretionary analysis and apply its own 
“independent business judgment” as to whether continuing the suit was in the 
corporation’s interest.171 Because the special litigation committee almost always 
recommended dismissal of the suit, and the courts typically deferred to the committee’s 
recommendation,172 this device has made it virtually impossible for plaintiffs, even those 
with valid claims, to survive this procedural mechanism. An exception to this deferential 
pattern came in Lewis v. Fuqua,173 where the court of chancery denied a single-member 
special litigation committee’s motion to dismiss due to extensive political and financial 
ties between the committee member and the corporation’s CEO.174
4. Disney Litigation (Disney I) 
The court of chancery decision in In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation 
(Disney I)175 demonstrates the power of these procedural mechanisms to frustrate 
plaintiffs’ meritorious claims. Disney hired Michael Ovitz, a close friend of CEO 
Michael Eisner, as its president and chief operating officer. By all accounts, Ovitz’s 
tenure at Disney was a spectacular failure. Within twelve months, Ovitz was seeking 
other employment. With Eisner’s help, Ovitz negotiated a soft landing, departing Disney 
after fourteen months with a severance package worth $140 million. Disney shareholders 
brought a derivative action against Disney’s directors and former directors. They alleged 
breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty both for initially approving Ovitz’s 
employment contract and for subsequently approving Disney’s non-fault termination of 
Ovitz, which entitled him to receive such exorbitant benefits. 
The Disney defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to make demand. 
Despite the extraordinary facts alleged in the case, the court displayed a skeptical attitude 
to the plaintiffs’ case.176 According to the court, the sheer dollar amount of the severance 
and the unusual circumstances under which it was granted did not mean that conventional 
settlement of the lawsuit. COX & HAZEN, supra note 16, at 436. 
 168. CLARK, supra note 131, at 645. 
 169. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
 170. Id. at 788. 
 171. Id. at 789. 
 172. COX & HAZEN, supra note 131, at 436. But see Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 966-67 (Del. Ch. 
1985). 
 173. 502 A.2d 962 (Del. 1985). 
 174. Id. A more typical decision deferring to the special litigation committee is Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 
501 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
 175. 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 176. See id. at 350 (stating: 
Just as the 85,000 ton cruise ships Disney Magic and Disney Wonder are forced by science to obey 
the same laws of buoyancy as Disneyland’s significantly smaller Jungle Cruise ships, so is a 
corporate board’s extraordinary decision to award a $140 million severance package governed by 
the same corporate law principles as its everyday decision to authorize a loan). 
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corporate governance rules would not apply in evaluating the board’s decision.177 
Instead, the court resolved to analyze the plaintiffs’ claims “using the same tools it uses 
in any corporate law case, namely, the requirement of demand or its excusal, the Aronson 
v. Lewis test, the basic rules of disclosure and, most significantly, the business judgment 
rule.”178
Central to the plaintiffs’ claim of demand futility was that Eisner had an 
impermissible interest in Ovitz’s employment contract, due to his close friendship with 
Ovitz. Eisner allegedly used his domination over the board to force them to approve 
Ovitz’s ill-advised contract. The plaintiffs also argued that Eisner relied on his 
domination of the board to goad them to approve Ovitz’s “non-fault termination” and the 
lucrative severance benefits granted thereunder. 
The court gave little credence to these arguments.179 Stating that “a board member 
is considered to be disinterested when he or she neither stands to benefit financially from 
nor suffer materially from the decision whether to pursue the claim sought in the 
derivative plaintiff’s demand,”180 the court limited its inquiry into Eisner’s independence 
into any financial benefit to Eisner from the Ovitz agreement or the subsequent non-fault 
termination.181 Finding that the plaintiffs had not credibly alleged such financial interest, 
the court held Eisner’s independence beyond reproach.182 In so holding, the court 
minimized the relevance of Eisner’s relationship with Ovitz stating that “[d]emand is not 
excused . . . just because directors would have to sue ‘their friends, family and business 
associates.’”183
The court also evaluated plaintiffs’ claims that Eisner dominated the board of 
directors. Despite extensive personal and professional ties among Eisner and most of the 
other Disney directors, the court found that at least nine of the twelve board members 
were independent of Eisner. Not only did the court deem several Disney executives, 
former executives, and consultants independent of Eisner,184 it also found independent 
individuals with more personal connections to Eisner. For example, Father Leo J. 
O’Donovan was president of Georgetown University, which Eisner’s son had attended 
and to which Eisner personally had contributed more than $1 million.185 Another 
director, Reveta Bowers, was the principal of the elementary school that Eisner’s children 
once attended.186 The court ruled that neither these personal connections to Eisner, nor 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 350-51. 
 179. Id. at 355 (stating that “[t]he fact that Eisner has longstanding personal and business ties to Ovitz 
cannot overcome the presumption of independence that all directors, including Eisner, are afforded”). 
 180. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 354. 
 181. Id. at 355-56. 
 182. Id. at 356 (declaring that “no reasonable doubt can exist as to Eisner’s disinterest in the approval of the 
Employment Agreement, as a matter of law. Similarly Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a reasonable doubt that 
Eisner was disinterested in granting Ovitz a Non-Fault Termination . . . .”). 
 183. Id. at 355 n.18 (quoting Abrams v. Koether, 766 F. Supp. 237, 256 (D.N.J. 1991) (applying Delaware 
law)). 
 184. Id. at 356-60 (deeming independent Roy Disney (a Disney executive), Cardon Walker (a former 
Disney executive, paid consultant, and investor in Disney films), Gary Wilson (retired executive whose wife 
was a paid Disney consultant), and former Senator George Mitchell (a paid consultant and attorney for 
Disney)). 
 185. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 359. 
 186. Id. 
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the relative significance of the directors’ fees paid to these individuals created doubt as to 
their ability to act independently of Eisner.187 Ultimately, the court concluded that 
because of plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate Eisner’s interest in Ovitz’s employment 
contract, and their failure to raise reasonable doubt of the independence of a majority of 
the directors, plaintiffs had failed to meet Aronson’s first prong for demand excusal.188
The plaintiffs fared no better under Aronson’s second prong, which required that the 
facts alleged raise a reasonable doubt that the “challenged transaction was the product of 
a valid exercise of business judgment.”189 The fact that directors had not calculated the 
total cost of the severance package was not fatal to the defendants’ claim of business 
judgment rule protection. The court stated that “the board is not required to be informed 
of every fact, but rather is required to be reasonably informed.”190 Likewise, the court 
found plaintiffs’ claims of waste deficient because “in the absence of fraud this court’s 
deference to the directors’ business judgment is particularly broad in matters of executive 
compensation.”191 The Disney directors’ decision to grant Ovitz a non-fault termination, 
despite his non-performance and his own initiation of the termination of his employment, 
was also protected by the business judgment rule.192
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of all of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.193 While displaying some concern about the Disney board’s performance, the 
court reserved its contempt for the plaintiffs’ pleading efforts. Calling the complaint a 
“pastiche of prolix invective,”194 the supreme court agreed that plaintiffs had failed to 
satisfy the demand requirement.195 In a partial reversal, however, the supreme court 
granted the plaintiffs’ leave to amend their pleadings to satisfy the second prong of 
Aronson by alleging facts that created a reasonable doubt that the boards’ decisions were 
entitled to business judgment rule protection.196
5. Question of Independence 
The Disney I decision highlights the central role that independent directors play in 
providing a shield from liability for directors accused of a breach of duty. The standard 
for directorial independence is notoriously low.197 Importantly, the Delaware courts 
rejected notions of structural bias that many argue significantly impact directors’ 
decisions.198 Under this rubric, even allegations of self-dealing that were not entitled to 
business judgment rule protection could be shielded from judicial scrutiny by relying on 
independent directors to reject demand or to dismiss derivative litigation through a 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 363. 
 189. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 190. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 362. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 364. 
 193. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 194. Id. at 249. 
 195. Id. at 248. 
 196. Id. at 267. The plaintiffs amended their complaint, and the amended complaint, considered post-Enron, 
received a different reception from the court of chancery. See infra text at notes 207-226. 
 197. Essentially plaintiffs had to show at the pleading stage, without the benefit of discovery, that a 
majority of directors would suffer financially unless they refused demand. 
 198. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 166, at 85. 
JONES FINAL 5/13/2004  2:41 PM 
654 The Journal of Corporation Law [Spring 
 
special litigation committee. These defenses presume the courts’ acceptance of the 
defendants’ claims that the directors charged with the relevant decision are 
“independent.” Once courts display a willingness to question the defendants’ claims of 
independent director decision-making, this protective veil falls away, and directors must 
defend their actions on the merits. 
Similarly, business judgment rule protection depends on the court’s acceptance of 
the notion that the board engaged in “informed, good-faith decision-making.” If the 
courts question this presumption (even on occasion), the automatic protection of the 
business judgment rule becomes elusive. By denying defendants the benefit of the doubt, 
the courts can significantly alter the substantive law without altering judicial doctrine. 
Thus, the courts can execute the elegant maneuver of maintaining consistent legal 
standards while altering the stringency with which these standards are applied on a case-
by-case basis. 
D. Delaware Law: Post-Enron 
Exposure of Enron’s frauds triggered a national debate on the need for corporate 
reform. Even before Sarbanes-Oxley, Delaware jurists began to acknowledge the need for 
state-level reform to forestall federal action.199 The Act’s provisions merely sharpened 
the preemptive threat. Delaware’s most recent corporate decisions depart dramatically 
from the tradition of management deference that preceded Enron.200
It is possible that Delaware would have proceeded on a path of reform absent the 
national debate that led to Sarbanes-Oxley. It is also possible that the recent 
jurisprudential shifts are simply a part of the natural norm evolution that characterizes the 
common law. Despite these possibilities, judicial comments expressing concern that 
Congress might displace Delaware’s sovereignty provide a reason to explore other factors 
that might have contributed to this apparent shift. 
In his Business Lawyer article, Vice-Chancellor Strine foreshadowed many of these 
judicially-led reforms. For example, Strine presaged reforms in standards for judging 
directorial independence, stating, “I believe that Enron will ignite a fiery debate centered 
upon the so-called ‘independent director.’”201 He predicted that plaintiffs will seek to 
“reverse existing presumptions, and ask our courts to presume, at the pleading stage, that 
directors who have questionable ties to management are not independent for purposes of 
dismissal motions.”202 He also predicted the tightening of procedural mechanisms for 
dismissing derivative litigation,203 and the possibility of piercing the protective veil 
provided by exculpatory charter provisions.204 On that score, Strine anticipated that “the 
court will be called on to conclude that a director who is conscious that he is not devoting 
 199. See Strine, supra note 117. 
 200. Some may counter that because the major scandals occurred at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, none of 
which were Delaware corporations, Delaware’s legislature or judges should not bear any sense of responsibility 
for these scandals. Such analysis ignores the reality that all states have enacted enabling statutes that 
substantially mimic Delaware’s legal rules, and that most other state courts look to Delaware for precedent on 
corporate law matters. 
 201. Strine, supra note 117, at 1373. 
 202. Id. at 1382. 
 203. Id. at 1383. 
 204. Id. at 1393. 
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sufficient attention to his duties is not acting in good faith, and is therefore not entitled to 
exculpation from damages liability.”205
Delaware’s recent decisions appear to draw on Strine’s analysis. The courts have 
refused in preliminary motions to resolve directors’ claims of independence in 
defendants’ favor. Furthermore, the courts have denied defendants the protection of the 
business judgment rule in instances where it probably would have applied in the past.206
1. Duty of Care 
In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II),207 the court undermined the 
reliability of two stalwart defenses to due care claims: the business judgment rule and 
exculpation. In this decision, Chancellor Chandler, the author of Disney I, revisited the 
claims of plaintiffs who had objected to Michael Ovitz’s generous severance package.208 
In the pre-Enron era, Chancellor Chandler had dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims.209 In 
Disney II, he concluded that the boards’ alleged conduct may have constituted such gross 
negligence as to violate Delaware’s “good faith” requirements, thereby denying 
defendants exculpatory protections. 
In Disney II, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged that Disney’s directors failed 
to exercise any business judgment in approving Ovitz’s employment agreement and his 
non-fault termination.210 Some of the particularized facts in the amended complaint 
differed from the complaint presented in Disney I.211 Viewed broadly, however, the 
amended complaint presented the same factual pattern shaped to comply with the limits 
of the supreme court’s remand.212
The court evaluated plaintiffs’ new allegations only under Aronson’s second prong: 
whether they alleged facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the challenged 
 205. It is interesting to note that the reasoning of the opinions in Disney II, Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 
A.2d 257 (Del. 2002), Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277 (Del. 2003), and Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 
A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) rest largely on the arguments that Vice-Chancellor Strine articulated in his article. 
 206. Recent decisions have also applied stricter standards for evaluating board conduct in the takeover 
context. See MM Companies v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
 207. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) [hereinafter Disney II]. 
 208. See supra notes 182-199 and accompanying text. 
 209. The supreme court upheld the chancellor’s ruling, but reversed the “with prejudice” aspect of the 
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims that the boards’ processes were not entitled to business judgment rule protection. 
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 248. 
 210. Disney II, 825 A.2d at 277-78. 
 211. The plaintiffs had obtained access to corporate books and records (including board minutes and 
corporate correspondence) allowing them to provide better factual support for their allegations. Perhaps the 
most legally significant difference between the old and new complaints was the plaintiffs’ allegation in Disney 
II that compensation expert Graef Crystal had not advised the board on Ovitz’s agreement. This new allegation 
eliminated the directors’ potential section 141(e) defense of reliance on experts. The new complaint also alleged 
that Disney’s board never formally approved Ovitz’s non-fault termination and the consequential severance 
payments, weakening the directors’ claims of business judgment rule protection. 
 212. Both complaints tell the same basic story: Disney’s board capitulated to Eisner in hiring his close 
friend Ovitz, providing a generous compensation package and severance terms that created perverse incentives 
by guaranteeing payment for failure. The board compounded its error by permitting Ovitz’s non-fault 
termination which locked in benefits to which Ovitz (based on his performance as president) was not entitled. 
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transactions were entitled to business judgment rule protection.213 This time Chancellor 
Chandler concluded that allegations did create such doubt.214 Remarkably, he rejected 
the defendants’ exculpation defense, ruling that the facts alleged created a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the directors acted “honestly and in good faith.”215 Because section 
102(b)(7) forbids exculpation for “acts or omission not in good faith,” this ruling offered 
plaintiffs a path around the exculpatory provision’s formidable protective barrier. 
Reminiscent of the widely-disparaged Van Gorkom216 decision, the court lambasted the 
board’s decision-making process, scrutinizing the amount of time it spent considering 
Ovitz’s agreement (ten minutes), the page length of the board minutes (one and one-half 
pages) and the information made available to the board at the time of such approval.217
In Disney I, Chancellor Chandler adopted a deferential approach to evaluating board 
conduct. He dismissed as insignificant the board’s alleged failure to quantify the value of 
Ovitz’s termination payout, stating that “[a] board is not required to be informed of every 
fact, but rather is required to be reasonably informed.”218 In a remarkable reversal, in 
Disney II, Chancellor Chandler found the plaintiffs’ allegations quite troubling: 
These facts, if true, do more than portray directors who, in a negligent or 
grossly negligent manner, merely failed to inform themselves or to deliberate 
adequately about an issue of material importance to their corporation. Instead, 
the facts alleged in the new complaint suggest that the defendant directors 
consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a “we 
don’t care about the risks” attitude concerning a material corporate decision.219
Such harsh scrutiny of board conduct departs sharply from the attitude exhibited in 
Disney I, which opens with irreverent metaphors to cruise ships and theme park rides.220 
 213. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). This treatment was consistent with the supreme court’s 
order in Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262. 
 214. Disney II, 825 A.2d at 288-89. 
 215. Id. at 286. 
 216. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 217. Disney II, 825 A.2d at 287-88. 
 218. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 362. 
 219. Disney II, 825 A.2d at 289. Chancellor Chandler attributed the different outcome on the two different 
allegations in the new complaint. Id. at 279 & n.5. Although this is a plausible explanation of the different 
outcomes on the motions to dismiss, it fails to fully account for the differences in tone, language, and legal 
conclusions between the two court of chancery opinions. More seems to be going on than the simple application 
of consistent legal standards to the facts presented to the court. It seems likely that an altered legal and political 
environment contributed to Chancellor Chandler’s shift in approach. In Brehm, Chief Justice Veasey described 
the facts in Disney I as “troubling.” Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249. Concurring, Justice Hartnett viewed the allegations 
sufficient to survive dismissal. Id. at 268 (Hartnett, J. concurring). In addition, Chief Justice Veasey put the 
public spotlight on Brehm (and implicitly, the court of chancery’s prospective ruling in Disney II) as an example 
of how the Delaware courts were willing to scrutinize directors’ executive pay decisions. See Roundtable, supra 
note 2, at 76. Thus, the partial reversal in Brehm, Chief Justice Veasey’s widely-disseminated comments, and 
intervening supreme court decisions such as Telxon (discussed infra Section VI.D.2), represent significant 
additional factors that may have pushed the court toward the legal conclusions reached in Disney II. 
 220. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 350: 
Just as the 85,000 ton cruise ships Disney Magic and Disney Wonder are forced by science to 
obey the same laws of buoyancy as Disneyland’s significantly smaller Jungle Cruise ships, so is 
a corporate board’s extraordinary decision to award a $140 million severance package governed 
by the same corporate law principles as its everyday decision to authorize a loan. . . . Nature does 
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Chancellor Chandler also seems to revise his approach to the significance of Eisner’s 
friendship with Ovitz. Despite ruling in Disney I that the relationship had no bearing on 
Eisner’s or the board’s independence,221 he refers directly to Eisner’s and Ovitz’s 
friendship at least fifteen times in the course of his opinion.222
In addition to refusing to dismiss claims against Disney’s directors, the court let 
stand claims against Ovitz for breach of fiduciary duty, finding “the facts alleged, if true, 
would support an inference that Ovitz may have breached his fiduciary duties . . . by 
negotiating his employment agreement directly with his personal friend Eisner.”223 With 
respect to Ovitz’s negotiation of a non-fault termination with Eisner the court concluded 
that the facts alleged “would suggest a faithless fiduciary who obtained extraordinary 
personal financial benefits at the expense of the constituency for whom he was obliged to 
act honestly and in good faith.”224 The court held that because the terms of Ovitz’s 
employment and termination involved directorial self-compensation, such decisions lay 
outside the business judgment rule’s presumptive protection, and was subject to a 
showing that the compensation was fair.225 In Disney I, the court had summarily rejected 
this same argument, without acknowledging that the fairness test would apply to evaluate 
the loyalty claim.226
2. Duty of Loyalty 
Delaware’s recent jurisprudence also makes it more difficult for defendants to 
dispose of duty of loyalty claims. In particular, the courts have undercut the protective 
value of independent committee approval for conflict of interest transactions. The strict 
fairness test that applied to cash-out mergers, has been applied more broadly to a range of 
contexts including recapitalizations, corporate opportunity, and conflicts caused by 
interlocking directorates. 
a. Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson 
In Telxon Corp v. Meyerson,227 the court adopted a more stringent test for director 
independence. It also ruled that the question of director independence was not appropriate 
for determination on a summary judgment motion due to the factual nature of the inquiry. 
The Telxon court considered allegations that directors had breached their duty of loyalty 
not sink a ship merely because of its size, and neither do courts overrule a board’s decision to 
approve and later honor a severance package, merely because of its size. 
 221. Id. at 355. The supreme court upheld this aspect of the court’s ruling. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 258. 
Therefore, the independence issue was not before the court on remand. 
 222. Chancellor Chandler addresses this apparent incongruity in his opinion: 
The allegation that Eisner and Ovitz had been close friends for over twenty-five years is not 
mentioned to show self-interest or domination. Instead, the allegation is mentioned because it 
casts doubt on the good faith and judgment behind the Old and New Boards’ decisions to allow 
two close personal friends to control the payment of shareholders’ money to Ovitz. 
Disney II, 825 A.2d at 287 n.30. 
 223. Id. at 290. 
 224. Id. at 291. 
 225. Id. (citing Telxon, 802 A.2d at 265). 
 226. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 380. 
 227. 802 A.2d. 257 (Del. 2002). 
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by permitting the board chairman to usurp a corporate opportunity.228 The central figure 
in the case was Robert Meyerson, chairman of the board and a paid consultant to the 
company. The plaintiff alleged that Meyerson had breached his duty of loyalty by 
personally developing a product within the company’s line of business, and selling the 
technology back to Telxon for $17.3 million.229 The plaintiff also alleged that the other 
directors breached their duties by approving or acquiescing in these transactions.230 The 
court of chancery granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the duty of 
loyalty claims.231
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed.232 The supreme court agreed with the 
plaintiff that a material dispute existed as to the directors’ independence, creating 
questions as to whether such directors could make an independent decision not to pursue 
the business opportunity in question.233 The court rejected defendants’ arguments that 
independent directors had approved all of the challenged transactions entitling them to 
business judgment rule protection stating that “[d]irectors must not merely be 
independent, but must act independently.”234
The plaintiff sought to rebut the business judgment rule’s presumptions by alleging 
that Meyerson dominated the board. The plaintiff cited Meyerson’s influence on the 
directors’ compensation, his important position in the company, and the fact that the 
directors “respected his business acumen and often relied on his counsel” to support its 
allegations.235 The court of chancery had dismissed these arguments, correctly observing 
that “Delaware courts have consistently rejected assertions that a personal friendship 
without more, establishes a lack of independence.”236
In contrast, the supreme court opined “we cannot say whether or not the other 
Directors acted independently or were beholden to Meyerson such that they deferred to 
his will . . . .”237 The court therefore reversed, stating that, “[o]nly after a full picture of 
Meyerson’s relationship with the other Directors is developed can their independence be 
ascertained.”238 Thus, despite many successful preliminary motions granted on the basis 
of directors’ assertions of facial independence,239 the court in Telxon held that a fuller 
factual record was necessary to make such a determination.240
 228. Id. at 259-62. 
 229. Id. at 261. 
 230. Id. at 266. The plaintiffs also alleged that the directors had breached their duties by awarding 
themselves excessive compensation. Id. 
 231. Telxon, 802 A.2d at 262. 
 232. Id. at 266. 
 233. Id. at 264-65. 
 234. Id. at 264 (citing Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429 (Del. 1997)). 
 235. Id. at 265. 
 236. Merchants’ Nat’l Props., Inc. v. Meyerson, 2000 WL 1041229, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2000). 
 237. Telxon, 802 A.2d at 265. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264; Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991); Kahn v. Roberts, 
1995 WL 745056, at *5 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 240. Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264-65. 
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b. Krasner v. Moffett 
Krasner v. Moffett241 reiterated Telxon’s holding. In Krasner, the supreme court 
again rejected a defense premised on the ability of a committee of independent directors 
to cleanse a conflict of interest transaction. In Krasner, two related corporations, Freeport 
McMoRan Sulphur, Inc. (FSC) and McMoRan Oil and Gas Co. (MOXY), entered into 
merger negotiations.242 Because the two corporations had a number of common board 
members, each formed a special committee of independent directors to negotiate the 
merger.243 Under the terms of the resulting merger agreement, MOXY shareholders 
received a greater percentage interest in the merged entity than the FSC shareholders.244 
FSC shareholders challenged the merger claiming that its directors had violated their 
fiduciary duties by approving a transaction that was unfair to FSC.245 The court of 
chancery granted defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the special committee’s role in 
negotiating the transaction and recommending it to the full FSC board.246 The court 
reasoned that because none of the plaintiffs’ allegations impugned the integrity of the 
special committee, the FSC board’s decision would be evaluated under the business 
judgment standard of review.247
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed,248 rejecting the defendants’ arguments that 
the special committee process cleansed the conflicts of interests.249 It ruled that the 
directors had the burden of proving that the committee was independent and had real 
bargaining power, a burden they could not satisfy at the motion to dismiss stage.250 As in 
Telxon, the supreme court stated that “independence of the special committee involves a 
fact-intensive inquiry that varies from case to case. Thus, we cannot assume at the 
pleading stage that the defendants will carry the burden of establishing independence.”251
Two new rules seem to have emerged from Telxon and Krasner. First, approval by 
facially independent directors no longer suffices to shield conflict of interest transactions 
from judicial scrutiny.252 Actual independence measured in deeds, rather than financial 
interest, appears to be the new standard.253 Second, the question of independence seems 
to have shifted from primarily a legal issue to be resolved by a judge on a preliminary 
motion, to a question of fact entitling the plaintiff to discovery and a trial on the 
merits.254 This approach would seem to repudiate the standards established in Aronson, 
which facilitated dismissal at the pleading stage based on the strong presumptions of 
directorial independence. 
 241. 826 A.2d. at 277. 
 242. Id. at 279-80. 
 243. Id. at 280. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 281. 
 246. Krasner, 826 A.2d at 281-82. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 289. 
 249. Id. at 284. 
 250. Id. at 284-85. 
 251. Krasner, 826 A.2d at 286; see also Telxon, 802 A.2d at 265. 
 252. See Krasner, 826 A.2d at 284-87; Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264-65. 
 253. Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264 (“Directors must not only be independent but must act independently.”). 
 254. Krasner, 826 A.2d at 284-85. 
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3. Procedural Protections 
The Delaware courts have also made it more difficult for defendants to prevail using 
the standard procedural maneuvers that frequently ensured early dismissal of derivative 
litigation. In addition to the more stringent test for defeating a claim of demand futility on 
display in Disney II, In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig.255 dealt a blow to the 
previously reliable special litigation committee device. In Oracle, the court rejected a 
shareholder litigation committee’s claims of independence, finding the relationships 
among the members of the special committee and the defendants were fraught with 
conflicts.256 The court reached this conclusion despite the absence of the sort of financial 
dependence that Disney I and Aronson held as essential to finding a lack of 
independence. 
In Oracle, the plaintiffs sued four Oracle directors (including CEO Larry Ellison) 
for breaching their duty of loyalty by engaging in insider trading.257 Oracle formed a 
special litigation committee (“SLC”), comprised of two Stanford University professors 
recruited for the committee by two of the defendants.258 The SLC engaged in a lengthy 
investigation of the plaintiffs’ claims and produced a 1,100-page report that concluded 
that continuing the litigation was not in the corporation’s interests.259 The SLC then 
moved to terminate the derivative action.260 Applying Zapata, Vice Chancellor Strine 
concluded that the SLC had failed to persuade him that it was sufficiently independent to 
evaluate the merits of the litigation objectively.261 He uncharacteristically dissected the 
SLC members’ ties to the defendants which centered around their connections to Stanford 
University. Both SLC members, Joseph Grundfest and Hector Molina-Garcia, were 
Stanford professors and alumni.262 The defendants included Michael Boskin, a Stanford 
economics professor,263 and William Lucas, a Stanford alumnus who had contributed 
almost $16 million to Stanford.264 In addition, defendant CEO, Larry Ellison, had 
contributed more than $10 million to Stanford, and had negotiated with the school about 
a potential $170 million contribution to establish an “Ellison Scholars” program at 
Stanford.265
Vice Chancellor Strine ruled that such extensive social and professional connections 
precluded any presumption that the SLC would evaluate the plaintiffs’ claims solely on 
their merits, untainted by collegial sympathy or institutional loyalty.266 He therefore 
concluded “this was a social atmosphere painted in too much vivid Stanford Cardinal red 
 255. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 256. Id. at 920, 942. 
 257. Id. at 920. 
 258. Id. at 923-25. 
 259. Id. at 925. 
 260. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 928. 
 261. Id. at 942. 
 262. Id. at 923-24. 
 263. Id. at 930-31. Boskin taught Grundfest when Grundfest was a Ph.D. candidate at Stanford and also 
served alongside Grundfest as a senior fellow and steering committee member of a prestigious Stanford 
research institute. Id. 
 264. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 931-32. 
 265. Id. at 932-34. Ellison had also publicly stated his intention to bequeath his $100 million Silicon Valley 
estate to Stanford. Id. at 935. 
 266. Id. at 942. 
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for the SLC members to have reasonably ignored it. Summarized fairly, two Stanford 
professors were recruited to the Oracle board . . . and soon asked to investigate a fellow 
professor and two benefactors of the University.”267
While acknowledging that “there is admittedly case law that gives little weight to 
ties of friendship in the independence inquiry,”268 Strine rejected a formalistic approach 
to questions of independence asserting that, “Delaware law should not be based on a 
reductionist view of human nature that simplifies human motivations on the lines of the 
least sophisticated notions of the law and economics movement. Homo sapiens is not 
merely homo economicus. We may be thankful that an array of other motivations exist 
that influence human behavior . . . .”269
4. Question of Independence 
A common thread weaves through Delaware’s recent opinions. The courts express a 
new reluctance to credit defendants’ arguments which are premised on the assertion that 
the directors charged with making the challenged decision were independent. In Telxon 
and Krasner, the court undermined the cleansing power of independent committee 
approval of conflict transactions by weakening the independence presumption, at least for 
purposes of preliminary motions.270
In Oracle, the court flatly rejected the directors’ assertions of independence that 
might have been accepted in earlier times. Vice Chancellor Strine squarely acknowledged 
that his ruling departed from precedent stating: 
I readily concede that the result I reach is in tension with the specific outcome 
of certain other decisions. But I do not believe that the result I reach applies a 
new definition of independence; rather, it recognizes the importance (i.e., the 
materiality) of other bias creating factors other than fear that acting a certain 
way will invite economic retribution by the interested directors.271
In Disney II, a case in which the courts had finally adjudicated the question of the 
directors’ independence in the defendants’ favor, Chancellor Chandler nonetheless based 
much of his ruling on an underlying presumption that (a) Eisner had an interest in Ovitz’s 
employment arrangements and (b) Eisner dominated the board of directors.272 Absent 
Eisner’s domination and control, why would the board, as alleged by the plaintiffs, 
abdicate all responsibility for monitoring and approving Ovitz’s employment and 
termination arrangements? Furthermore, in finding that Ovitz may have breached his duty 
of loyalty by negotiating directly with Eisner, rather than the independent compensation 
committee, the Chancellor again impugned Eisner’s independence.273
 267. Id. at 947. Vice Chancellor Strine also stated: “In my view an emphasis on [‘]domination and 
control[’] would serve only to fetishize much-parroted language, at the cost of denuding the independence 
inquiry of its intellectual integrity.” Oracle, 824 A.2d at 935. 
 268. Id. at 939. 
 269. Id. at 938. 
 270. Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 259, 264-65 (Del. 2002); Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 286 
(Del. 2003). 
 271. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 939 n.55. 
 272. Disney II, 825 A.2d at 287-90. 
 273. Id. at 290-91. 
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5. Summary 
Admittedly, the small number of cases discussed above forms a small sample for 
making ultimate conclusions about the proper role of federal and state governments in 
shaping corporate law rules. Nonetheless, a fundamental shift in Delaware corporate 
jurisprudence does seem to have occurred. Two Delaware judges (including the chief 
justice) have publicly stated their belief in the necessity of legal reforms in light of the 
scandals and the federal preemptive threat.274 In addition, corporate practitioners have 
taken notice of the courts’ trend toward higher scrutiny of board decision-making.275 
These lawyers’ advice to their clients in light of these decisions further supports the 
inference that a shift in jurisprudence has occurred.276 As Professor Rock has argued 
“[i]n a world of vaguely defined norms and rapidly evolving transactional forms what the 
business lawyer tells the client . . . is the law.”277
E. Looking Forward 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the evolution of a trend toward stricter judicial 
decision-making in Delaware. The emergence of this trend correlates in time with 
significant corporate reforms at the federal level. In addition, public statements from 
influential Delaware judges support the argument that these recent developments form 
part of an effort to forestall further preemption. Other observers have reached similar 
conclusions on the likely explanation for the perceived shift in jurisprudence.278 Despite 
the strong circumstantial evidence presented here, it is impossible to definitively establish 
the precise reasons for this widely-perceived shift. In fact, at least one Delaware judge 
rejects the proposition that the factors identified in this Article actually influence judges 
in their decision-making.279 Having laid out the case that the preemptive threat plays a 
 274. See Roundtable, supra note 2; Strine, supra note 117. 
 275. See J. Travis Laster & Michael K. Reilly, A Warning Shot for Directors? Delaware Supreme Court 
Reverses Four Court of Chancery Decisions, INSIGHTS, Feb. 2003, at 2 (stating that “the issuance of four 
decisions adverse to directors within a short time period is noteworthy”). 
 276. See, e.g., Memorandum from Weil, Gotshal & Manges, to “Our Clients and Friends” on Director 
Liability Warnings from Delaware (Jan. 10, 2003) (on file with author); Memorandum from Meredith M. 
Brown & William D. Regner, Debevoise & Plimpton, to “Our Clients and Friends,” on What’s Happening to 
the Business Judgment Rule? (June 19, 2003) (on file with author) (discussing Disney II, Oracle and In re 
Abbott Laboratories, 325 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 2002), and concluding, “in our view, recent Delaware cases 
indicate an increased risk of director liability”); Memorandum from Martin K. Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Business Judgment Rule is Alive and Well (June 18, 2003) (on file with 
author) (discussing Disney and Abbott Laboratories and observing that “these two decisions are examples of the 
heightened scrutiny that all board conduct is subjec to in the post-Enron climate”). 
 277. Rock, supra note 74, at 1096. 
 278. See, e.g., Marc Gunther, Boards Beware, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003 (“It would not be unreasonable to 
assume that the Delaware courts are responding to the Enron and WorldCom headlines and the intrusion, so to 
speak, of the federal government into the internal governance of corporations.” (quoting former Delaware 
Chancellor William T. Allen)); Triumph of the Pygmy State, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2003 at 55, 56. (“Reacting to 
the latest anti-business sentiment in Washington, D.C., Delaware’s judges appear ready to adopt a more 
hawkish line on the duty of directors to represent shareholders’ interests.”). 
 279. In comments to the author, Chancellor Chandler states: 
Judges (whether or not you believe this) decide cases based on the particularized facts before them, 
not on whether it will affect the competitive position of the state via other competitors for corporate 
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significant role in Delaware’s current jurisprudence, I must leave it to readers to accept or 
reject this argument. For those who are receptive to the analysis set forth here, a few 
prescriptive observations are in order. 
There is reason to suspect that if the federal threat recedes, Delaware will revert to 
its more lax jurisprudence.280 The history of Delaware law is replete with examples of 
the imposition of strict judicial standards, followed by prolonged periods of deference. 
The same indeterminacy that permits judges to impose more restrictive standards of 
director conduct can be used to relax such standards when the political climate 
changes.281 Though perhaps inescapable, this possibility only bolsters arguments for 
sustained federal engagement in corporate governance issues to prevent such 
retrenchment. Congress must continue to monitor corporate conduct, remaining apprised 
of developments in state corporate codes and jurisprudence. In addition, Congress must 
be willing to preempt objectionable state law rules. 
Congress can maintain a credible preemptive threat by demonstrating a sustained 
interest in corporate governance issues. The SEC, through its enforcement and rule-
making functions, should remain at the forefront of this vigilance. Congress can 
demonstrate its continued engagement by holding hearings on governance issues, 
investigating corporate misconduct, and actively overseeing the SEC’s enforcement of 
federal securities laws, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The response in Congress and in Delaware to the recent corporate scandals 
demonstrates that the model of vertical regulatory competition framed in the Federalist 
Papers endures. This political dynamic also reveals flaws in modern federalist arguments 
denouncing national-level regulation. Unreflective allegiance to the internal affairs 
doctrine and the economic theories invoked in its defense should no longer serve to 
dissuade Congress from preempting objectionable provisions of state corporate law. 
Instead, the threat of federal preemption remains a necessary predicate to the ability of 
the national citizenry to pressure the state of Delaware to shape its corporate law to 
reflect national rather than parochial interests. 
 
charters . . . And in a larger sense, I also think academics sometimes miss the point that judges are 
not legislators, and they are not given a commission to change the laws based on the headlines of 
the day. 
E-mail from William B. Chandler III, Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery, to author (Nov. 6, 2003)(on file 
with author). 
 280. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858, and Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), are examples 
of Delaware decisions that imposed strict standards of liability that were later reversed or disregarded by courts. 
 281. Rock, supra note 74, at 1105. 
